
ICANN80 | PF – RSS GWG Work Session (4 of 4)
Wednesday, June 12, 2024 – 10:45 to 12:15 KGL

BRAD VERD: All right, welcome back. Everybody had time to ruminate and discuss bicameral? Is that where we feel stage one is the best place. Sorry, I'm trying to get my screens organized here. Two chambers in one house as Liman stated. Not hearing any objections. Hans?

HANS PETTER HOLEN: Chambers and houses sounds complicated to me. I don't like complicated structures Looking at us from the outside and any attempt to create a structure where the root server operators get a veto in the oversight process is going to cause concern from the outside world. So I think we should be very, very careful with creating some structure that would obviously make that. So a two-chamber system where the root server operators in one chamber can veto changes from the other house I think it's a terrible idea.

BRAD VERD: Let me push back on that a bit. One, there's no authority here. No authority to do anything other than make recommendations. So I just want to keep reminding people because I feel like some of these statements are made with the turnkey version in mind. And we're not talking about the turnkey version. We're talking about stage one. What is minimum viable? Kurt, your hand is up.

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KURT PRITZ:

Yes. So notwithstanding it's the minimum viable, I agree that the initiation of a bicameral system would create a veto ability. And I think that's a fundamental question for the root server operators is whether they want to entertain or embark down the road of a methodology that would provide that veto or the other side of that is that say there's a dozen or 13 root server operators in the room and six TLDs, create an atmosphere where the other side of that is, none of the TLD operators might support a policy. But the root server operators could theoretically carry the day in a vote. I think we're starting—so for me, I'm against the bicameral sort of arrangement where there might be a veto.

And I think we're focusing a lot on voting and I'm not quite there yet. I think we should focus on consensus-based policies. Policies are supposed to be kind of difficult to make. And so, I think what we should be thinking about is some consensus-based decision-making system. Consensus doesn't mean unanimous, but rather get general agreement across the parties that some policy should be adopted.

So I think it's a question for the root server operators. Do they want to provide a veto to TLD operators? And I think the answer to that is probably no, then talk about what the decision-making process is. Thanks.

BRAD VERD:

Thanks, Kurt. Liman?

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN:

Thank you. I agree that the risk of criticism for a bicameral system is high. So that's something that definitely is a weight in the balance of the system. The thing that I see with the veto system actually works both ways is that we—the worst outcome of such a system is that there is no

change, which actually speaks for stability. And the status that change—the starting point for the proposed change would be something that we already had agreed upon, so that must be a good state unless the environment around it changes and forces some kind of change [inaudible] to the system.

So I hear a lot of opposition for the bicameral system, and I'm not going to die on that hill. So I will continue to listen to the discussion, but I am not going to drive the bicameral thing forward. Thanks.

BRAD VERD:

Sam?

SAM EISNER:

Thanks. So not to advocate for the bicameral system or against it, but I do think that we have ways that you can build in protections against veto in a bicameral system particularly to make sure that there's never the ability of the non-RSO side to impose things on the RSO side without RSO agreement. We've done things like this within the GNSO, where we have certain protections of certain minimum required thresholds on each side for something to move forward, but also say for example that on the contracted parties, a policy can't go through them and pose new obligations on them Just because one side of the house was really in favor.

I bet you still need a minimum threshold on other side. So we probably have ways that we can work around some of the veto issues if the idea of the continued the flexibility of the system that Wes was talking about and to kind of be agnostic to the number of RSOs if that's going to be something that we intend to possibly be in flux because of the designation of removal functions that will be there and maybe this is

also something that it doesn't need to take into account in step one because maybe we're not going to fully have a designation or removal function in step one. Right, because I take your point too as to why it might not be necessary in one phase, but in the other – so there's a lot of different ways you can work it.

But I think it's important to make sure you keep those ideas that we have in the principles document, right? Nothing can be imposed on RSOs without their agreement. But also, make sure you have the other principles of the multistakeholder component that you're going to have in here and make sure that any voting system or any consensus-based system is current. So I cannot really uphold that multi-stakeholder component of what we're building.

BRAD VERD:

Ken?

KEN RENARD:

Yeah, I think this goes back to a model that Carlos had proposed several years ago. Flipping the terminology here, consensus of the two houses versus going at veto power at least in my mind changes that. And RSSAC58, I believe says that the RSO should have a significant say. Equal is pretty significant. I've always been a proponent for bicameral system that separation of houses should be only for voting. And that the day-to-day dialogue should just include everyone. We shouldn't be locked in our separate buildings across town. The debate, the discussion, the day-to-day stuff should be done among everybody, whether the RSO, not RSOs, everything. Thanks.

BRAD VERD: Thanks, good discussion. I guess, the question that I have for the group is for stage one, again, this is stage one. The minimum viable, are we talking some bicameral something or the RSOs plus the C's and the G's sitting at a table. Wes?

WES HARDAKER: For stage one, we don't need to have the flexibility that I was advocating for earlier as long as the power to make changes to the number in a particular group that is changeable by the system is beyond that point. So we've already at least so far determined that you can't add or remove an RSO until much later. So it's fine if we have just a pure number of people. The problem with a pure number of people, in the long run is, a council of 24 or 36, if the C's and G's want equal weight, which I don't know why—if I was a C or a G, I wouldn't want equal weight.

That number gets unreasonably hard to manage in terms of people. And so, in the long run, all of these groups will need to figure out how to appoint representation that votes yea or nay based on the group underneath with a smaller set of representation because that's just not a realistic model. If we want to do that at the start, great. I would argue, we should really work toward fixing that problem quickly because I don't know of any—well, I guess, many congresses and things like that actually do have that many participants, but we don't want to get to that level. We want something more efficient than that in terms of creating meetings and having votes. My opinion.

BRAD VERD: Thanks, Wes. Liman?

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- LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: Yes, thank you. I was rather assured by Sam's statement, so I'm happy with going that way. But I do think that we need to figure out the power balance on the voting system before going forward because I think it will be very difficult to change that after the fact because changing the balance at a later stage means that someone relinquishes its power and someone else gains power and the relinquishing side will not be happy to do that. So it needs to be done from the start, I think.
- BRAD VERD: Kurt?
- KURT PRITZ: I certainly agree with what Liman just said that we should do that. A bicameral structure adds complexity and I think we should start as simple as possible and add complexity as we go along. So if we find out a simple structure does not enable us to arrive at decisions efficiently, then maybe we add a layer of complexity such as a bicameral house or some other more complex voting or consensus building process. But initially, I think we should stick with a simple structure.
- BRAD VERD: Liman, old hand. Ken?
- KEN RENARD: Yeah, so good points brought up. I'm certainly happy with that bicameral being pushed out to stage two or three with the idea that—supporting what Liman just said about this is the expectation that there will be a—this is the way voting would end up going, again, if we choose that. I kind of feel stage one should mostly be concerned with the final bootstrapping of the council or the governance structure itself. Finalizing charters, things like that.
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So given the fact that we've said very little power or no power in stage one, the voting, the bicameral formalities do not necessarily need to be their stage one. But if we set that expectation, we can avoid the people relinquishing power.

BRAD VERD:

Thanks, Ken. Rob? You're done. So I keep hearing keep it simple and then I keep hearing voting rights. So how do we keep it simple with voting rights? How does the group want to approach this? Originally, it was 12, 5 and 5, then 12, 6 and 6, and then 36. I think that is a bit of a stretch. Maybe not even a reasonable extreme. There was a conversation in the past. I don't remember if it was in DC or San Juan that was the question about the level of engagement we might get from the Registry Stakeholder Group. I kind of worry about getting 6, even from everybody, from the C's or the G's. So I guess, that's an outstanding question or something we should think about. Rob, your hand is back up.

ROBERT CAROLINA:

Yeah, I wanted to address the challenge you just gave us about voting. Broadly speaking, I tend to lean in the direction of the people who are saying, let's keep this as simple as possible and bicameral creates a level of complexity we might not be ready for. In terms of voting, I think you will have all heard me say on multiple occasions how much I am not a fan of a consensus-based decision-making model. However, watch Rob turn.

At the stage one, minimum viable, low-stakes environment where we're working with each other in a structure, it seems to me that a consensus-based model is probably the simplest one to document and to

administer in these early days. And it strikes me that, if we spend too much time worrying about voting protections, I just worry about our ability to conclude even stage one. So it may be that simply having a single large group that operates predominantly on a consensus model may be the way to go with stage one. Now let me assure all of you, I'm not a fan of that at stage four. But I think it might be enough to get us started.

BRAD VERD:

Thanks, Rob. Wes?

WES HARDAKER:

I think the thing we're dancing around is sort of what is the requirement of the voting system or what is the requirement of the decision-making system so that no entity can—whether the entity is a house or individuals or whatever, can be stripped of the power that they have by a change to the system in itself, right? That is the thing that is always of concern is, when I get outvoted, it's going to be a constitution change that removes me or greatly diminishes my power. Now the downside of that is you get blocking. That's where the tension always is, right? So that no change ever happens and that can be equally as bad if—I mean, we were talking about that earlier with vetoes, right?

There's not an easy dance around that but for I think whatever goes into stage one, whatever mechanism we get to make decisions based on voting consensus or whatever, it's got to not upset the power balance within the original system itself. And at that point, we can make a better structure for bicameral or tricameral or quad cameral or whatever we want to do as long as the group agrees as a whole, everybody in the group agrees that that can go forward that way.

BRAD VERD: Peter?

PETER KOCH: Thanks, Brad. This is Peter. I would agree with simpler structure and not necessarily bicameral from the start. However, let me say—so I wonder when you, Robert said that it's easier administrable, the consensus part. We're just deferring or delaying the problem because then we need to find out either we or give the structure a way to find out, which is an interesting bootstrapping exercise how is consensus determined? We had discussions a couple of minutes ago about vetoes, right? So that's just the negative form of not having a consensus. So if that's the “threat model” or the fear, then obviously there needs to be a different definition of consensus rather than having it full consensus. And all that can be done but it has to be done. So even if we agreed, yeah, consensus model is good, and I think it is on a general note. The devil again lies in the details. So not opposed, but I'm just saying that the work needs to be done anyway.

BRAD VERD: Hans?

HANS PETTER HOLEN: So going for a consensus decision-making model, which I like also removes all the tensions around observers or fully voting members of the committees, right? So I think that's a good thing with that respect. However, making decisions in consensus-based thing with a large group, that's going to be really hard.

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- BRAD VERD: I want to expand on that because if you add all 180 plus CCs and a thousand, whatever, registries, you're at a really large group. So going back to Wes's comment about the power balance, how does that work in this keep it simple consensus-driven model?
- HANS PETTER HOLEN: So you thought I was joking when I said 42, but you're now suggesting all TLDs, great.
- BRAD VERD: I'm not suggesting. I'm translating what was said. And if I got it wrong, that's why I'm asking the question. So Hans, your hand is up. No. Peter? I'm sorry, Rob.
- ROBERT CAROLINA: Yeah, just to clarify, when I said consensus, I'm speaking now very specifically of consensus among those members of the council whom we have identified as representatives of participant stakeholder communities. And that's in response to a comment that I think I heard from Hans. It wasn't my intention to—well, I don't think that has any bearing on the question of observer versus a decision-making participant. I'm only speaking about consensus among the people we've identified previously as decision-making participants
- BRAD VERD: For somebody who's trying to put this down on paper or in a cell, how do we document this consensus model? What's it look like? Yeah, Rob?
- ROBERT CAROLINA: I just want to ask a question that struck me as I was reading the language in this cell D4 structure. Identifying council members and power balance voting system. Are we talking about a stage one where

the stage one system commences when the participants in question sign up to whatever the memorandum of understanding is, and that's the point where they launch.

Is that what we're talking about, stage one or are you viewing stage one as the process of negotiating and finalizing all those things and stage two is after signature of all the...? I'm a little confused about the distinction. Some of the descriptive language here and the distinction that's being drawn between.

BRAD VERD: I believe the descriptive language was trying to translate what you said earlier. And so, if it is wrong or interpreted wrong, then we just need to clarify it.

ROBERT CAROLINA: Okay, let me have a look at this and I'll see if I can drop a comment in the cell.

BRAD VERD: Sorry to be a broken record here but we're like, what does the council look like in stage one? This is why I – Wes?

WES HARDAKER: Mostly to get people to yell at me by putting an example that will certainly hurt somebody, right? That's the way we start. How about how many number of representatives that each of the three stakeholders— so I was talking to Jeff earlier. My memory is horrible. I was trying to remember. At the end of the workshop, we agreed, the RSOs, the gTLDs and the ccTLDs would each be the three voting sectors? Okay. Just clarifying that for my head, right?

I would say, however many members each one of those wanted to a point and you have to have unanimous decision which is more than consensus. But to some extent we are trying to make decisions about a power structure ahead of everybody being appointed. We have representatives right now too from various groups and things like. And I recognize that that is a crazy proposal because then it could be as large as all the TLDs or whatever, yes.

Hopefully, that's not what will happen. But the unanimous part is, to some extent I think is almost necessary in the initial bootstrap because that's where if they're going to come up with a different voting system that in order to make any change, if we want a stable a system as possible. It has to be completely agreed to. And I recognize that's hard and it could be an absolute blocker. But there you go. There's a proposal, hit me.

BRAD VERD:

All right. So I'm going to ask one question that—I'm going to channel a question, let's say. I keep hearing this. Almost I'm implying what I'm about to say. I'm inferring what I'm about to say from what I've heard, which is, equality amongst the three stakeholders. And I guess my question is, which of the three stakeholders has anything to lose here? Who's giving up something and which isn't? And does that play into the question of the power balance? So I'll let that sit for a second. Kurt, to you.

KURT PRITZ:

I Just want to add the point that the registry stakeholder group the GTLDs will almost certainly always vote as a block. So if there's a controversial issue, the Registry Stakeholder Group will discuss it and

come forward with an opinion that represents the joint position of the Registry Stakeholder Group if there is one and if there isn't one, then we'll probably abstain. That mechanism is intended to protect the smaller registry. So it allows the smaller registries to participate in the discussion even though they might not have the people to sit at the table. So when it comes to the consensus call, the registries will almost always vote as one.

BRAD VERD:

Thanks, Kurt. Sam?

SAM EISNER:

Thanks. Just wanted to call attention to what Carlos just put into the chat, which is that we have a principle against requiring unanimity because of the difficulties that establishes within governance. So maybe close to unanimity, but we already have a principle against it.

WES HARDAKER:

Yeah. And Carlos posted that to the text, and that's a good catch. I could make the argument. Again, I was throwing out a straw man in order to get a discussion about what's right, but I could argue that that principle really applies to the end game and not necessarily how we're going to get to the end game. So in stage one, it may not be that case .

BRAD VERD:

You want to reply, Sam?

SAM EISNER:

Thanks. I think that unanimity at any point gives the incentive of someone choosing not to participate and holding up the entirety of the process. And so, any place where you require unanimity you then actually compel participation and someone can frustrate the entire

process by staying away. And I think that's what we want to stay away from because we do want to give this entity the ability to move forward and not build in. We want things with high bars but we don't want to really give the ability for any single entity to just frustrate the entire purpose.

WES HARDAKER: Can I ask a follow-up question before you go to Rob? So Sam, I think you probably know better than me at least how does the GAC deal with that issue?

SAM EISNER: So the GAC has dealt with it by having—for example, so GAC consensus advice actually requires full consensus of the membership, but what they've allowed themselves to do now is they actually have a different level of GAC advice. It's not consensus advice and the GAC has other ways to still identify areas of concern and issues of concern and dialogue with the board and the community even if they don't have consensus. So that's how they've got that.

BRAD VERD: Thanks, Sam. Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA: I just wanted to briefly acknowledge that Wes makes a reasonable point about the degree to which we're required to adhere to all of the principles completely at stage one. I think that's a good point to remind ourselves of. And even when we get to stage four, some of these principles and the success criteria from our RSSAC058 are going to be in tension with one another. So there's going to be a balance to be struck

between them. Having said that, Wes, for all the reasons just already explained, I'm really not a fan of unanimity.

WES HARDAKER: Okay. So propose an alternative. That's the goal.

ROBERT CAROLINA: Okay. All right, Wes, let's engage on this a little bit. I began with the idea that basic decision-making in the council could be by consensus and one of the reasons that consensus might be a viable way forward is it's a relatively simple mechanism. So is majority voting but majority voting becomes incessantly complicated because we have so many different constituent stakeholder communities here. Reminding ourselves that the stage one governance structure is meant to be a low stakes environment that has the power to compel nothing.

It can't designate. It can't strip a designation. It can't compel anyone to make contributions, financial contributions. There's going to have to be a lot of goodwill somewhere for some people to stump up money for whatever money is going to be necessary for this to work even at a light touch layer. So I'm trying to grapple, Wes, with what is the—is the core of your concern, what about the power to change the constitution? Is there a bootstrapping power that this stage one governance group could adopt by consensus with one very vigorous voice saying, oh no, this is a disaster but all the rest of you are now overwhelming me. And as a result, that just automatically launches stage two. Is that the kind of concern you're...?

WES HARDAKER: Yeah, let me give you the hypothetical.

ROBERT CAROLINA: Oh, sure, please.

WES HARDAKER: What in stage one is the voting requirement required to change the voting requirement? So it's the constitutional aspect that you just talked about, right? That's I think one of the most concern at the same time because you're massively disrupting the power struggle structure. So what do you need in stage one to be able to make that forward progress for the rest of time essentially?

ROBERT CAROLINA: I'm sorry, go ahead.

BRAD VERD: I mean, that answer is in box G, whatever, G14, which we've said needs to be put in each of the acceptance criteria, which is all parties have to agree before moving to the next stage essentially. That's what was stated earlier.

ROBERT CAROLINA: Just to respond, it was stated earlier. Although when I said it, I said we need to have a discussion about what do we mean by agree? And this is now the discussion that Wes has opened because we're having a discussion about what would it mean to agree. It seems to be boiled down to the question of, how do you make decisions to amend whatever this constitution is no matter how light touch?

The light touch MOU that I think of off the top of my head, and Hans Petter, I'm looking in your direction now. If I recall correctly, the NRO, MOU which only has five parties as signatories, if I recall correctly, it requires agreement by all five in order to amend, which is a simple mechanism. That requires unanimity. With the large number of people

that we have, unanimity probably isn't viable. It may well be that amending the terms of whatever this core document is might be the only thing we do have to have a deep discussion about in terms of how that agreement is made.

But I don't think that needs to be a discussion about decision-making generally by the council. I don't think the discussion about how do we amend this light touch by law or whatever it is. I don't think that needs to be the same discussion as how do we adopt a recommended policy or how do we—yeah, I think those are two different discussions. It's a good discussion to have but I just want to narrow it as much as possible

BRAD VERD:

Thanks Rob. Peter?

PETER KOCH:

Thanks Brad. So I was going to echo the interpretation here understanding that the bootstrapping structure is not able to make these operational or yeah, more operational decisions. The reason for dancing around the consensus [inaudible] everything is exactly that it is bootstrapping the structure. So it's setting the future. So it should be accessible in a fair way. I guess, we circumscribed that in the principles. And precaution should be built in that not by picking the numbers now. We're actually laying the lines in favor of whatever side in that process. So I'm not so much worried about that structure doing preempting future decisions about that. That's probably not what's on the table but the bootstrapping and maybe we need to be a bit more concrete about what the boundaries of that bootstrapping are. The constitutional guardrails, I guess, that were already mentioned, which is also

important if we take this away to the constituencies and to the public.
So we need a bit more elaboration here. Thank you.

BRAD VERD:

Hans?

HANS PETTER HOLEN:

So why I love to use the NRO and the ASO as an example for how to do things, current NRO MOU is signed by five parties and to change it, you need five parties. One of the parties currently do not have a governing board and thus, no changes can be made to the MOU. It's worse because agreements with third parties such as trademarks in one legal entity by the IETF, which is a minor tiny detail that has no bearing on the actual operations on the internet. Thank you. They want to change that from one legal entity to another for reasons.

And four of us are happy to sign that. The fifth entity is probably also happy to sign that transfer, but there is no way to do that right now. So if we think to bootstrap things, having everybody to sign up on it, so it's unanimous to get off the ground. That may be a good mechanism, but it's going to be very dangerous to have that requirement going forward. There needs to be then some ways of handling cases if somebody gets in a position where they're not able to exercise a proper signature on documents.

BRAD VERD:

All right. So I'll throw one out there. I'll throw a grenade, so to speak. I'm here to keep it simple, but there's all these caveats. Whether I like it or not I feel like the 12 RSOs feel like they have to bet 12 seats at this council in stage one. I'm not sure they're ready for a representative model there. Regardless of how much I wish they were. So if that's the

case, there's 12 and the way I had thought about it with the balance of power was between the RSOs and the registries so it'd be six and six. And then we need to figure out if—and then beyond that becomes is it consensus here or is it something else?

And then what are the—I hesitate to say this word? I have acceptance criteria on the sheet originally and originally on my whiteboard when I did it I said trigger. What was the trigger to get to get to the next stage? What is the mechanism that is used to change what was referred to as the balance of power? Is that fair to say? I don't want to say constitutional documents yet because we're not there yet but like the—I don't know what the right term is, voting power or whatnot. So Hans, your hand is back up? No. Stage one, yes, no? People don't like it. Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA: So Brad, just to clarify, you're asking now the question of, what is the trigger or what are we calling the acceptance criteria down on row 13 that gets stage one up and running?

BRAD VERD: No, no, no.

ROBERT CAROLINA: I'm sorry.

BRAD VERD: So I'm trying to identify what the council looks like in stage one still. We still haven't come to that resolution yet or a consensus or whatever you want to call it. We as a group here cannot identify what we think stage one council looks like and I feel like we can't figure that out is because we keep getting wrapped around the balance of power topic. If it's bicameral, we don't want to have a veto. So there's all these other

things. If it's not bicameral, if it seats only, the seats get too big and what's the balance look like?

There's all these what-if scenarios for each of the sides let's say. So if we're trying to identify what the council looks like, that's my question. It's been the question since we started this. What does the council look like in stage one? And we got to start somewhere. And as I stated, I don't believe the RSOs are ready for a representative model. So you've got 12 seats on the council for the RSOs and then how many other seats for the other participant stakeholders?

ROBERT CAROLINA: I'll say it again, 12 split evenly between the C's and the G's.

BRAD VERD: So we're at 24?

ROBERT CAROLINA: Plus one each from each of the observers.

BRAD VERD: Agreed, the liaisons are all—they get to ride along here, but that's not—

ROBERT CAROLINA: I was just making a concrete proposal that we could make it to each but I'm suggesting one each inbound liaisons from those identified

BRAD VERD: Wes? No. Hans?

HANS PETTER HOLEN: Yes. So I'm not sure. Okay, two questions. Who is not ready for a representative model? I can go along with representative model so that we could reduce from 12 to 6 or 4. I would be fine with that. We need to grow up here. And secondly, I think it should be 50-50 as you suggested.

So if it's 12, it's 12. If it's 4 it's 4, just throwing that out there as—I don't think everybody is against the representative model. Maybe some but it would be interesting to hear who and why.

BRAD VERD:

Let's back this down then. So is it 50-50? Let's start with that question, between the registries and the RSOs. Let's just start there. What are the thoughts? I see thumbs up in the room, but I see that from a lot of RSOs.

WES HARDAKER:

I actually think I haven't heard anybody go against 24. So actually, let's start there because nobody has said anything against it. Is there anybody that believes that 24 is not the right starting number for stage one?

HANS PETTER HOLEN:

Oh, I just said that I would be happy with this model.

WES HARDAKER:

Would you be happy with 24? I understand I would be happy with a smaller number.

BRAD VERD:

Trust me, Hans, when I say the discussion when we get to the other stages, they're going to include a representative model. We're just not there yet. I'm trying to get off the ground. All right, so 24. Liman, your hand is up.

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN:

Thank you. So when we get off the ground, we will start to rebuild the aircraft in flight, right? Twenty-four is actually just about the size of this room. That's not unmanageable, so I think that that actually works. And about representation for routes of operators, we did try that. It didn't

quite work out. I'm not saying it's not going to work in the future, but we probably need to, as you say, discuss it further and find ways to do that. And probably experiment a bit to make that work. We need we must be open to try things and realize it doesn't work and try something else.

And this this future model must be able to handle that. But as for 24 as a starting point, we can talk here. We are not quite 24, but when the committee is full, we are around 24 and then it kind of works. Thanks.

BRAD VERD:

All right, so I feel like in this box at least in my homework that I did, I said the council is established. So it sounds like we've just made a quick definition of the council. And the council recognizes the participant stakeholders as well as formally and any liaisons or observer roles and then the other stakeholder communities. So it's kind of what the council does here and then, it gives advice and that's non-binding, non-authority. Liman? What do we think, stage one? I'm ready to claim victory because nobody's—

WES HARDAKER:

Apologies, Brad, could you repeat your—too many conversations at once.

BRAD VERD:

I'm happy to try, yes. So again, for this box, what I had done in my homework was the council is a point seated. Let's say, established with what we just said, which is 24, 12, 6 and 6, right? And then also, the council, that council of 24 then formally identifies the liaisons, the observers, and the participant stakeholder groups, even though they're already participating. They formally say, these are our participants

stakeholder communities and then their power is to give advice and nothing more. It's non-binding. That's where we are in stage one.

WES HARDAKER: Who are they giving advice to, clarification?

BRAD VERD: To the RSOs, to the community. To the RSOs. Who do you want them to give advice to?

WES HARDAKER: Well, you were the one saying that's all they could do. I wanted to know what you meant. That's all.

BRAD VERD: Well, they have no power is what I'm stating. They have no real power to hold somebody or remove somebody. All those decisions come later as we've stated. Sorry, I'm on a different screen. Ken?

KEN RENARD: As mentioned before though, will they also have the power to complete the charter, finalize change the charter?

BRAD VERD: Maybe said differently is, maybe they should have those powers. This is not for me to decide. This is for the room to decide. Liman?

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: If they don't have any power and we aim for something further down the line, who empowers them and at what stage, at which trigger as you say, triggers the empowerment of this council?

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- BRAD VERD: Again, this goes back to the original statement, right? The success of this recommendation will rely on the acceptance from the assenting parties and my question to you is, who's the assenting party here?
- LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: I'm actually sorry for [inaudible]. I'm struggling a little with that word, the [inaudible] parties?
- BRAD VERD: The assenting, the ones who have to agree.
- LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: Okay, fair. So if the council agrees within itself.
- BRAD VERD: No, but I mean, who are the assenting parties? Rob?
- ROBERT CAROLINA: Actually, that's a question that I think we ought to look at soon is, if we assume for purposes of discussion that this lightweight stage-one minimum viable structure is documented under the terms of an MOU. Here's the thought experiment. Who are the signatories to the MOU? Now at the moment, we know that the 12 RSOs are each independent. There's no body that's vested with authority to sign on their behalf. So my question becomes – so the question then becomes among the registry communities, who signs for them or are we talking about chasing around for hundreds of signatures?
- BRAD VERD: Liman? Okay. So the question now on the stage is, so we've agreed to what the council looks like in stage one but the question currently in front of the group is who would be signing an MOU should there be one?

ROBERT CAROLINA: I'm sorry, 12 RSOs plus what or whom?

BRAD VERD: Sam.

SAM EISNER: Well, the other question could be, does it have to be an MOU? Could it be agreeing to participate to the terms of a charter? Are there other ways to do this that don't – what would be the benefit of having an MOU versus a different mechanism that could just allow people to come in and participate and understand that the terms under which they're participating.

BRAD VERD: Hans.

HANS PETTER HOLEN: Assuming there is a piece of paper saying something along the lines that we think this is a good idea and we agreed to participate in the best interest of developing this in the future. Call it an MOU or whatnot. All the RSOs need to sign it and all the other participating communities need to sign it in order to create, the common understanding that is what we want and there may be a different document that we need to sign with ICANN/IANA that says something that IANA promises to spend sufficient time on this and give expert advice when needed, so that we are sure that we get their input. On the other hand, also IANA agrees at some point that may not be stage one but two or three to take authority from this governance structure on certain matters like updating the hints file or whatnot when we go to that.

But in the first phase, I think the participants in this, if you want a seat around the table, you need to sign on to some kind of yeah, I'm going

into that with the best intentions to participate. If you want to take it further, it may be commitments from the RSO to live up to minimum standard and so on. But that may be in the next phase and may require a good policy development process to set those minimum standards for this or that. But in the first phase, those around the table needs to sign.

BRAD VERD: I don't think we're in a minimum standard yet. Peter?

PETER KOCH: So I'm trying to figure out who exactly is supposed to sign here and there are different models and I'm not leaning toward towards anyone in particular but hearing that the RSO would sign on their own behalf individually, then either the designated representatives of the TLDs or the appointing bodies should sign. And that needs to be clear in advance. There would be an asymmetry, of course but that's something that we need to convey very clearly. So Hans Petter says, channeling him here, appointing bodies. And I think that's what I read, but the other version could also help, but yeah. Thank you.

BRAD VERD: Yeah, I believe the Registry Stakeholder Group and ccNSO has the ability to sign something like that, right, as a group.

PETER KOCH: I am confident that that can work on the same—

BRAD VERD: I believe that that power is there somewhere, maybe not.

SAM EISNER: Well, the capacity to enter into a legally binding instrument of sorts depends on whether you have some form of recognition of entity, and I

don't know that the ccNSO would be willing to have that form of corporate entity or that statement of person amongst it or whether the Registry Stakeholder Group, even though it does have a corporate structure, if they would be willing to enter as the Registry Stakeholder Group structure into an MOU. And there's a lot that goes into saying you have the capacity to enter into a legal instrument.

BRAD VERD: Okay, hold on. Peter, your hand is up.

PETER KOCH: Yeah, it stayed up but anyway. Yeah, so I didn't mean to actually preempt that. There's also the slight difficulty that we'd have here that the ccNSO is a membership organization. There are still some TLDs that we usually incorporate in the work and we would also be able to appoint somebody from a non-member ccTLD. But any kind of whatever, formal agreement would likely not cover those. So the difficulty here is finding out what the exact ask is and what the exact nature of this signature is? And I'm sorry, that sounds like administrative, very important.

BRAD VERD: Thanks, Peter. Liman?

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: Thanks. First, in response to you, the reason that we can't have something where people step in and agree to something is that we have to keep the entire root server system consistent. So everyone has to be on board and we have to move it as a unit. Would it be sufficient if we could get the ccNSO and the DNSO to make a statement of support for

this because I believe, as you believe that that might be possible.
Thanks.

SAM EISNER: So just in response to that, this is where I don't want to suggest how any group would organize itself or come in. There are probably ways that we could organize things but this is land of hypotheticals that I don't feel confident to weigh in on at this point.

BRAD VERD: Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA: I think this is starting to tease out some of the questions that I started asking myself when we were in Washington as well. Just a couple of things. One is that I am intrigued by Sam's earlier suggestion that it might be possible to create something like a charter document that explains participation without necessarily requiring signatures on a document like an MOU. I think there's something to be said for that particularly given that we're talking about a group that has at stage one no formal powers. Maybe we don't need anything, maybe MOU is still too heavy. Maybe that's not light enough touch, having a charter. Another possibility that sort of would bootstrap forward would be if the RSOs collectively they don't have to sign something perhaps. But collectively make a statement that we have adopted this charter and then the charter itself specifically calls out and identifies, how do people participate and it specifically sets out that the Registry Stakeholder Group has the right to appoint this many people to the council. The ccNSO has a right to appoint this many people at the council. It's kind of self-correcting because then we have a document

that has been created by the will of the people currently operating the RSS that also specifically designates who's invited into the system and who can then participate.

I don't know something like that but maybe an MOU with signatures is not the way to go. At one point, I'm only half kidding, but I did have a discussion with somebody in Washington where I said, at some point I'm tempted to just say let's call let's call a constitutional convention at the IETF and just invite every TLD on the planet to send as many people as they want to and have a day and decide, just ask everybody in a room, which of course is not at all viable. But nonetheless it's designed to illustrate the point that we got to somehow figure out who are the representatives of these communities we're trying to engage with, but I do like that.

I do like that mechanism that would not require signatures on an MOU. I think there's a lot to be said for that.

BRAD VERD:

Hans?

Hans Petter Holen:

I'm all for being practical here. However, the participating community that's the term we used, wants to make known to the outside world that they have made the decisions to appoint people to participate in this function whether that's through a resolution or that's by signing a document or whatever, I'm open for that but we need to have something from them saying that we're actually going to participate in this. It can't just be that somebody claims to come into the room being from the CCNSO and nobody really knows who appointed them and the

CCNSO council comes two years later and said who sent these people there? I mean there needs to be some kind of commitment from the other side and yeah, let's not create a legal barrier for that. I mean at this stage. I guess there is nobody from the from the governance structure that can sign anything either. So, we shouldn't create that barrier.

BRAD VERD:

Yeah, so it sounds like MOU is not an option at this stage because based on what I'm hearing that's there's nobody that can sign for the participant stakeholders. I guess the question is now, kind of what Robert said, we're back to just the RSOs and then the RSOs are either an MOU or some charter and then inviting in the participant stakeholders based upon this. Is that where we're at now, on stage one?

All right. So stage one is now. I'll try to say this again. Stage one is now, the council consists of the RSOs, either an MOU or a charter that needs to be determined and/or hashed out somewhere. And then in that charter or following the MOU, an invitation to the defined participant stakeholder communities, which currently are the C's and the G's to participate. And in theory, based upon the previous discussion the participation would be a representative model with six seats to each of those C's and G's. Plus all the observers, I don't mean to leave them out, but is that a correct interpretation of where this discussion just ended? Does he object? Hans, your hand is up.

BRAD VERD:

There's been a lot of confusion in this room, so I'm trying to think of the reader as they read it where the confusion might be. Wes?

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- WES HARDAKER: Yeah, just clarification. I think that you were trying to tie stage one to stage zero and so, the thing is, is that, in stage zero we agreed it's undefined. I would argue that the council is formed by them coming together the first time. And the same way that – that's actually, how root ops was formed. That's documented in RSSAC23, right? That for the first time they met.
- BRAD VERD: Yeah. I mean, if we use that as an example, it's the first time they met, and they all agreed then to work together, right? And to kind of run root ops and that's what I'm saying is, does stage one have to be the same here, right?
- WES HARDAKER: Right. So I wouldn't have root ops invite the rest. I don't think that looks good at all.
- BRAD VERD: Edmon?
- EDMON CHUNG: Yeah, I think going back to yesterday, within one stage, there could be multiple steps, right? So I think what you're describing might be within stage one, that there's step one and step two rather than stage two.
- BRAD VERD: All right. So then in stage one, as we work through, we've got the RSOs that are now participating in the council. Other participant stakeholder communities, they are now participating in the council and the community. Is that fair to say? And the same with the other stakeholder communities, they are now participating in the community, but not the not the council. Is that fair? I see Jeff.
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JEFF OSBORN: Maybe I'm just getting confused, but I'm wondering whether they don't have to be in the council starting in stage one because the council doesn't have any power. So how does it add them if it has no power?

BRAD VERD: Who's they, sorry, in your statement?

JEFF OSBORN: I'm sorry. The council. What is the council made up of and we're talking about adding to it as whether that's in stage one or stage two?

BRAD VERD: So I'll say it again, the council as we just discussed, is made up of the 12 RSOs either doing an MOU or a charter or something they will document what their intent is and then they invite the C's and the G's in. So the ccNSO and the—I'm sorry, the registry stakeholder group and the ccNSO in with the six seats. So then you've got your 24 seated council in stage one.

JEFF OSBORN: Got it. I misunderstood. Thank you.

BRAD VERD: Again, if you look at the components of the of the governance structure, there's the RSOs, so what are they doing now? The RSOs are now participating in the council. Fair enough, right? They're also participating in the community. Fair enough, right? You've got the other participant stakeholder communities. Again, they are participating in the council via their representatives and they're participating in the community, correct? And the same for the other stakeholder communities. We all agree on that, right?

The only difference with the other is they're not on the council so they just participate in the community. This is where everybody has stated that everybody even the guy off the street needs to have a voice into this thing if he wants it via public comment or whatever, right? Okay, stage one I'm going to ask the question. Committees, yes, or no? Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA: Yes, as needed, but let's not specify. In fact, I think it was Hans Petter earlier who said, as soon as you have a governing body that has as many as 24 people, you can't really get along without having some type of a committee structure. You're going to have to appoint somebody to do something. Otherwise, nothing will get done.

BRAD VERD: All right. So committees are as specified by the council. Ken?

KEN RENARD: I was just going to say that that's fine, as necessary by the council but as a council's bootstrapping here I don't think it's important to have the PMMF of these things. The only exception being the executive committee should be bootstrapped during this phase defined or...

BRAD VERD: Yeah, the way I see it is that the GWG would define these things. They define all these different—they define the communities as we've identified thus far whether or not they're appointed at that time or seated at that time is something up to the council. It's not up to the GWG.

KEN RENARD: Fair enough.

BRAD VERD: All right, secretariat. Oh, Jeff, I'm sorry. Your hand is up. Is that old? All right, secretariat. Where is this in stage one? Does it continue as is? Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA: I think the stage one structure ought to try to impanel some type of part-time secretariat function that reports to the council even if it's a very light touch inexpensive secretariat function. I think to get it off the ground, we need to have some type of separately identifiable secretariat to hold it together. The experience that we've had recently within—I'm going to speak out of term here or tell tales out of school depending on which metaphor you like. In root ops, many of the people in this room know that we have been struggling with some of the functions that would normally be just normal conduct of business, orderly conduct of business by a secretariat.

And I think that for this to function well, we ought to try to stump up enough money internally by voluntary contribution to do the same thing just to just to handle some logistical and administrative basics.

BRAD VERD: All right, so we're saying—we said two things in that statement. One is you're saying that the secretariat should be existing and functioning even if it's just light touch, but you also said funding should come from within.

ROBERT CAROLINA: Well, I've probably got ahead of myself there, but because eventually someone's going to ask the question, okay, so how do we pay for that. And then the lower down on the rows, I think we're looking at everything being self-financed in stage one is where we're going to end up. And I think this is the sort of thing. Operations are self-financed by

the RSOs still so no change there from stage zero. The governance structure is now, we've got something new now or new-ish. And I think also, by voluntary contribution, we ought to try to get a functioning light touch secretariat.

Now if there's no voluntary contributions that come forward, we're kind of stalled, but I think we ought to aspire to it and we ought to aspire to it in stage one. We ought to do it in stage one.

BRAD VERD:

Okay. Did we capture that? Seems like Carlos got it, but did we get it right? Did everybody see it? All right. So the secretariat performs light touch administrative tasks for support to the council and governance when you change that from example to self-funded by the RSOs. Is that what the group is saying? Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA:

Well, what I was trying to say is voluntary contribution. I didn't name the parties. I probably did name the parties earlier contributions from—I probably did say earlier and I wanted to back off from that. I think I originally said voluntary contributions by RSOs because I know that there are at least some RSOs who are able to make voluntary contributions to some degree. But I'd like to actually leave that open. Voluntary contribution from participant stakeholder communities.

If we've got some TLDs out there who want to help contribute to this as well financially, then the more the merrier. Great. But I think it has to be at this stage. Anything, any financial contribution has to be voluntary in order to get us off the ground at this stage. But yeah, the only limitation would be from the participant stakeholder—well, yeah, I think for other

principal reasons it would have to be from the participant stakeholder communities.

BRAD VERD: Peter?

PETER KOCH: Thanks, Brad. Peter here. Just saying that normal position should not be misread as a commitment for future contributions at this stage. Thank you.

BRAD VERD: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the first part.

PETER KOCH: Not opposing to this text, should not be misinterpreted or not to be interpreted as a commitment for future contributions. The idea needs to be socialized with the appointing organizations or just SOs, I should say, sorry.

BRAD VERD: All right. Hans?

HANS PETTER HOLEN: Just an observation here. Now we're running RSSAC or this thing here supported by ICANN. Some of us are here on our own time and own travel. Some of us here gets travel support. In this future setup, completely independent. We're all here on our own dime and we need to pay for our own secretariat service. I'm fine with that. Are all the contributing or participating parties fine with that. And I think, I guess that's where your comment comes from. Actually, you need to go and check with whoever writes that check.

I think that's food for thought, which is also why I said that I might actually be more comfortable with being represented by somebody rather than participating here because if all the root servers need to be here to make sure that their voice is heard, then that's a cost that I would have to be willing to take rather than electing my friend to my right saying that he will actually be here to represent my point of view as well. So I don't have to spend neither time nor money on this. So I think that's kind of a crucial point that we get to at some point here. Maybe phase one is fine with this, but just think about everybody. Are you willing to then not have any travel support or support from ICANN to go into this if it's completely separate, question mark?

BRAD VERD:

Yeah, let me just add to this. This is putting stuff on the wall right now trying to figure out what the stages look like. Nobody's committing to anything. Nobody's being obligated to do anything here. But you are correct, Hans. It's something to think about and should the group continue down this road that it needs to be independent though there are consequences and implications of making it such.

All right, money for governance. That again, seems like the same thing we just said for the secretariat. Voluntary contributions from participant stakeholders. All right, feels like Carlos has already got that. He's ahead of me. And then funding for operations is self-funded by the RSOs, agreed? Any objection? All right. Now we've already talked a little bit about it, but the obligation piece, norms versus the obligation piece, this is where in either in the acceptance criteria or in the obligations piece is where I would have put the MOU or a charter or something like

that. It's up above right now but I would move it down here to one of these sections so we kind of know what the obligation is. Thoughts? Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA:

At stage one, because we're talking about building a system where the stakes remain low, where we're still getting our feet wet, I think that stage one has to continue on a norms-based system. I think that's also almost mandatory given the discussion we just had about who might sign an MOU because as soon as you get to the point of stating obligations, I just don't think we're in a posture at stage one to state obligations from any of the participant stakeholder communities.

BRAD VERD:

This is probably not the right venue, but even for the RSOs, if the norm was documented, that would be new.

ROBERT CAROLINA:

I think it's no change from where we are today, Brad. We've got a whole series of listed principles that the RSOs abide by because they are norms of behavior that have a great deal of historical significance and that we all work together and influence each other to abide by it. But that is a norm of behavior, it is not an obligation in the sense where—if by obligation you mean something enforceable in the way a contract is enforceable, or in the way a shareholder agreement is enforceable.

BRAD VERD: Is an MOU enforceable?

ROBERT CAROLINA: Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. Sorry.

BRAD VERD: We've already removed the word contract from this discussion as per a number of people stated that, so I didn't imply contracts whatsoever.

ROBERT CAROLINA: No, I know, I know, but sometimes an MOU's is enforceable as a contract and sometimes it's not. And sometimes it's a statement that establishes a standard of care that can be sewed on under other theories. So it gets weird fast. But at the moment, I just don't see us being able at stage one to move beyond the norms-based approach to governance.

The main thing that we're achieving I think with stage one is better transparency, closer cooperation, a much finer focus, a more refined focus on who the participant stakeholders are. A structured means of direct dialogue between them on a recurring basis and a path forward which leads us to a day when we will all make mutual obligations to each other. I don't see stage one as the time for that.

BRAD VERD: So then as I stated earlier, which I thought it was either an MOU amongst the RSOs or a charter, it's no longer an MOU. Now it's just a charter, correct? Everybody agree? I'm just trying to fill in the blanks

here. That's all I'm trying to do and the blanks keep changing, so I'm trying to fill in the blanks. Wes, your hand is up.

WES HARDAKER:

So MOUs come with a ridiculous breadth of what can go in them and what is agreed to. And I would argue that if we want a minimally viable governance system, there should be a publicly produced written set of agreements on these entities are going to be participating in it. An MOU does not imply a commitment, it does not imply enforceability as you have said. I think that the results of this group should produce, at the end the minimal set of an MOU that basically says the University of Southern California agrees to participate in—we haven't talked names yet, right? What are we going to name the whole thing?

And maybe what that means is, and it gets a singular voting power or whatever it is. What is the minimum things that all the rest of these columns kind of amount to? It doesn't imply legal obligation as you have said yourself. So I do think that we can require that at stage one. And in fact, I don't think stage one will be successful as a minimal required governance system without some sort of documentation.

BRAD VERD:

Rob, your hand is up.

ROBERT CAROLINA:

Yeah, I think I need to clarify my statement, Wes. It was not my intention to say that an MOU never carries with it a legal obligation. That was not my intention. So to be more clear about it, there are times when a

memorandum of understanding does in fact create an enforceable legal obligation, sometimes. In terms of trying to document the stage one structure that we're talking about, we've discussed a couple of different mechanisms that might be available to us. I still think we should explore much more carefully.

This is the concept that Sam proposed earlier. However, I am not convinced that it is a critical success factor for the viability of stage one that we have a document that is signed by multiple institutions that need to be identified. If we go down that path, fine, but I want each and every RSO to consider who do they think their signatory is going to be and what is it that we're accomplishing with the MOU.

So I'm not persuaded that is necessary. I mean, you seem to be very forcefully in favor of that. I guess, that's the way I would characterize it. It seems to be a core requirement or you seem to be suggesting it's a core requirement. I'm not sure why you are. I don't quite get that.

BRAD VERD:

All right. We got a bunch of hands up. John Crain, again welcome.

JOHN CRAIN:

Thanks, and always happy to be here. Are we maybe front loading too much in stage one. I'm not sure but it feels like we're trying to solve a lot of things here that might actually be down for the GS to solve once they've got their council going. Noting that for a great part we are the GS, right, with other people as well.

BRAD VERD: That's a good question. I think this is where we've been all day is people are trying to figure out where the different pieces fit, John, so I don't think we have a clear answer to that one right now. Kurt?

JOHN CRAIN: Well, I'm just saying, I think we might be going too far. We might be trying—the perfect might be getting in the way of the good and getting us to a stage where we can move forward at some point.

BRAD VERD: Yeah, all right. Kurt?

KURT PRITZ: How it's often done in ICANN, and I think what we should do is in ICANN, the board chair might write a letter to the chair of the Registry Stakeholder Group and I think this group might write a letter to the chair of the Registry Stakeholder Group and say, a formal letter that says we're delighted to inform you that the Registry Stakeholder Group is being included in this council and we look forward to your active participation in the group. We've allocated this number of seats for our YSG participation to the extent we can. We would outline the time commitments and the duties we see at this early stage, let's say but there's a lot that's not known yet.

But I think there's some duty to let the council members, the participants know what they're in for and not just ask them to show up. And then, in return, you'll get a similarly formal letter back and say, gee whiz, this is this is terrific. We're looking forward to participating. We

will provide this many representatives and we'll let you know you asked for them on this date. So we'll give you names by this date.” So I think an exchange of letters would satisfy the requirement for a written commitment and also, help define to the extent we can what the job is, so that would be my recommendation.

BRAD VERD: Wes?

WES HARDAKER: Yeah, I would be fine with that too. What I am looking for is not even—so I'm not the lawyer in the room. I've proven that multiple times. What I find hard is to establish a government system with participants that doesn't have some documentation publicly declared somewhere that the rest of the world has to believe this is a valid form of government. And without the invitation letters or without the agreement, without the response from each of the participants saying yes, we're in, there's no notion of they actually committed. Yes, they were the initial party. There's no documentation to say, this is who it was formed from.

So that's all I'm really looking for and I don't think we need to have extensive information about what goes into it and anything else. But even invitation letters to me I think satisfies that as long as it's publicly posted.

BRAD VERD: Thanks, Wes. Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA:

I think those are all—Kurt's comments are well made as are Wes is. One thing we could do which is done sometimes when you're creating something, is we work to create the form of the engagement document, the charter whatever it is you want to call it, and I think I might just be repeating what was said earlier in which case forgive me. Somebody issues letters to somebody, whether it's GWG sending those letters to all of the participant stakeholder communities both the RSOs and the TLDs and the observers for that matter or it's somebody else inviting, somebody else.

I mean we can work out the seating arrangements later perhaps but you make it the first order of business of the of the new council to essentially ratify the charter. Having gathered together here in our first meeting, our first order of business is to say, here's this charter that drew us all here together and we wish to say to the world that we the representatives of these stakeholder communities hereby adopt this as our operating charter and your way or that's the starting [inaudible].

BRAD VERD:

Thanks, Rob. All right, time check. We've got three minutes left. So really quick, I think there's—one, I'm going to challenge everybody to go home, continue to think about this, work on the homework. Carlos and I will take what we've got here, try to pretty this up, so the visual is a little better. I think we need to continue the discussion on the different stages. Clearly, we've kind of pulled the layers of the onion apart a bit and revealed, some more challenges.

I think just my one comment around the letter or the invitation piece, which I fully agree with or have no problem with, I think there is a bit of a challenge, because I believe if I'm in the Registry Stakeholder Group and I get an invitation letter to join in this, I believe that it's probably operating under the ICANN umbrella and we have not stated that yet here. So that's something to consider as a group that we still need to address, and it's an unknown right now at least in my book on how to document that. Unless somebody else has an answer, I'm fully open to it. Rob?

ROBERT CAROLINA:

I would just say that just because an invitation letter is sent to someone like the Registry Stakeholder Group or the ccNSO, that says we wish to invite you to appoint x number of representatives to this new body, I don't think of necessity, that means that the new body is functioning with the ICANN framework. It simply means that the new body is recognizing that the representatives of that participant stakeholder community are the ICANN bodies named. Their touchpoint with the governance structure would consist of, at a minimum, simply appointing representatives.

BRAD VERD:

To be clear, that's not what I said.

ROBERT CAROLINA:

My apologies.

BRAD VERD:

What I said was, the perception of the person receiving the invitation would probably be, that this was happening under ICANN, which is entirely different than what was just stated so. All right. Any closing remarks from anybody? All right. I appreciate everybody's contribution. This has been beneficial. I feel like we've moved the ball forward, so thank you. And we will be in touch as we are adjourned.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]