

DNS DELEG

John Levine | ICANN 85 Mumbai |



What's the problem?

- DNS delegation is complicated and fragile
- Path authentication would be nice for ADoT / ADoQ
- Clean up part of the camel



Delegation today

```
example.com. DS 34909 8 2 1aebbf52...0ee5e2a9743c9
```

Parent only signs DS

```
example.com. NS ns1.example.com.
```

```
ns1.example.com. A 12.34.56.78
```

Child signs everything
else

```
example.com. SOA ns1.example.com dns.example.com. 2026030102 ...  
DNSKEY 256 3 8 AwEAA...I= ;{id = 18111 (zsk), size = 1024b}  
DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAA...8= ;{id = 34909 (ksk), size = 2048b}  
NS ns1.example.com.  
ns1.example.com. A 12.34.56.78
```

Delegation today

```
example.com. DS 34909 8 2 1ae1dfe818bbf52...0ee5e2a9743c9
```

```
example.com. NS ns1.example.com.
```

```
ns1.example.com. A 12.34.56.78
```

- Parent NS and glue are only hints
- Child zone can be served from anywhere so long as DS matches DNSKEY

```
example.com. DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAA...8= ;{id = 34909 (ksk), size = 2048b}
```

Delegation today

```
example.com. DS 34909 8 2 1ae1dfe818bbf52...0ee5e2a9743c9
```

```
example.com. NS ns1.example.com.  
ns1.example.com. A 12.34.56.78
```

```
example.com. SOA ns1.example.com dns.example.com. ...  
    DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAA...8= ;{id = 34909 (ksk)}  
    NS ns1.example.com.  
    NS ns2.example.com.  
ns1.example.com. A 22.33.44.55  
ns2.example.com. A 12.34.56.78
```

- Child NS and A/AAAA are definitive
- Need not agree with parent
- Which usually works except when it doesn't

Surely we can do better

DELEG

```
example.com. DS 34909 8 2 1ae1dfe2...0ee5e2a9743c9
DELEG server-ipv4=11.22.33.44,23.45.56.67
DELEG server-ipv6=2001:db8::123
DELEG server-name=ns1.bigisp.com
```

- Authoritative
DELEG in parent

- No DELEG in child

```
example.com. SOA ns1.example.com dns.example.com. 2026030102 ...
DNSKEY 258 3 8 AwEAA...I= ;{id = 18111 (zsk)}
DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAA...8= ;{id = 34909 (ksk)}
```

DELEG

```
example.com. DS 34909 8 2 1ae1dfe2...0ee5e2a9743c9  
  DELEG server-ipv4=11.22.33.44,23.45.56.67  
  DELEG server-ipv6=2001:db8::123  
  DELEG server-name=ns1.bigisp.com
```

- Parent has name and/or address of child server
- That's authoritative, child can't change it

No more glue

```
example.com. DS 34909 8 2 1ae1dfe2...0ee5e2a9743c9  
DELEG server-ipv4=11.22.33.44  
DELEG server-name=ns1.example.com.
```

- Parent has name and/or address of child server
- Name cannot be in child zone, use address instead

DELEGPARAM

```
example.com. DS 34909 8 2 1ae1dfe2...0ee5e2a9743c9  
DELEG include-delegparam=ns.myreg.com
```

```
ns.myreg.com. DELEGPARAM server-ipv4=11.22.33.44  
DELEGPARAM server-ipv6=2001:db8::123
```

- CNAME-like redirection (can also include CNAMEs)
- DELEGPARAM has same format as DELEG, but no zone cut or special processing

How do we get there from here

```
example.com. DS 34909 8 2 1aebbf52...0ee5e2a9743c9
NS ns1.example.com.
NS ns2.example.com.
DELEG server-ipv4=22.33.44.55,66.77.88.99
ns1.example.com. A 22.33.44.55
ns2.example.com. A 66.77.88.99
```

- New DE EDNS0 bit in queries
- “I understand DELEG”
- Referral response contains DELEG
- Or NS and glue if not

Anti-downgrade

- Authoritative Delegation Types (ADT) flag in DNSKEY (002)
- This server understands DELEG, check in NSEC in referrals it sends
- Prevents stripping DELEG, malicious fallback to NS
- Enforces DELEG chain of servers

```
example.com. SOA ns1.example.com dns.example.com. 2026030102 ...  
DNSKEY 258 3 8 AwEAA...I= ;{id = 18111 (zsk)  
DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAA...8= ;{id = 34909 (ksk)
```

Open issues

- DELEG-only zone cut and non-DE client
 - You lose? If so with what code
 - Synthetic NS? How hard to try? What about NS that don't have names?
- Early implementations
 - Seem to work, but hasn't been tested very hard
- Hope to publish later this year

Toward a new security model

- DELEG chain lets you say exactly which servers have your DNS data
 - Strictly top down now, no zone-level redo's
- Extensions to DELEG to require ADoT/ADoQ
 - Entire chain of lookups can be encrypted
- DELEG IP or name is authoritative
 - So can and should check for matching TLS certificate from child server
- If server is trustworthy
 - Maybe someday you can believe unsigned things it says?

DNS DELEG

John Levine | ICANN 85 Mumbai |

