ICANN85 Mumbai | CF – Joint Session: ICANN Board and CSG
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FRANCO CARRASCO

Hello. My name is Franco Carrasco, and I am the participation manager for this session. Welcome to the joint session between the ICANN Board and the Commercial Stakeholder Group. Please note that this session is being recorded and follows the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior, the ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy, and the Community Participant Code of Conduct concerning Statements of Interest.

Interpretation for this session today will include English, French, and Spanish. For our panelists today, we kindly ask that you please state your name for the record and the language that you will speak if speaking a language other than English. Please also speak at a reasonable pace. This discussion today is between the ICANN Board and the CSG members only, therefore we will not be taking any questions from the audience. Having said this, I will now hand the floor over to the ICANN Board chair, Tripti Sinha.

TRIPTI SINHA

Thank you, Franco. Good afternoon, everyone. This is the last bilateral meeting for today. And as Franco just shared, this is between the CSG and the Board. My colleague, Chris Buckridge is going to facilitate today's discussion. Chris, over to you.

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| CHRIS BUCKRIDGE | Okay. Thank you very much, Tripti. Thank you for joining us for this discussion between the Board and the Commercial Stakeholder Group of the Non-Contracted Parties House. We have a few topics to discuss here, but I thought we might start with a quick tour de table. We have a fairly packed table with both Board members and members from the Constituency, so I might just ask people to introduce themselves, perhaps starting with Greg. Thanks. |
| GREG DIBIASE | Greg DiBiase, ICANN Board. |
| LARS STEFFEN | Lars Steffen, ISPCP vice chair. |
| PHILIPPE FOUQUART | Philippe Fouquart, ISPCP chair. |
| JIM GALVIN | James Galvin, ICANN Board. |
| RAÚL ECHEBERRÍA | Raúl Echeberría, ICANN Board. |

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| JOHN MCELWAINE | John McElwaine, I'm the president of the IPC and currently the CSG chair. |
| KURTIS LINDQVIST | Kurtis Lindqvist, president/CEO of ICANN. |
| SAJID RAHMAN | Sajid Rahman, ICANN Board. |
| LEON SANCHEZ | Leon Sanchez, ICANN Board. |
| DAVID HUGHES | David Hughes, vice president, IPC. |
| MASON COLE | Mason Cole, chair of the BC. |
| MARIE PATTULLO | Marie Pattullo, BC, CSG liaison |
| SARAH DEUTSCH | Sarah Deutsch, ICANN Board. |
| CHRIS BUCKRIDGE | Okay. Thank you all very much, and glad to have you here. So I'll steer this a bit with John here as chair of the CSG. We had a couple |

of questions as the ICANN Board, which I think have been reflected in the topics that CSG is wanting to discuss here. Particularly from our side, we were asking about strategic priorities and any emerging trends, and I think that's reflected here. And then also about the Constituency's engagement with the Review of Reviews, and I think we'll touch on that later in the session. But I might jump to the first point, which I think, John, you're going to lead us into.

JOHN MCELWAINE That's right, Chris. We thought, from the CSG perspective, we would try to do less reading from statements and more having a dialogue. And part of the reason behind that was we weren't exactly as a stakeholder group really creative, because both the BC and the IPC came up with DNS abuse as a topic. So we thought we'd kind of tag team this, and I'm going to ask my colleagues, I know even Philippe had a story about DNS abuse, so that we will kind of maybe have this be more of a discussion.

So, to start, one of the trends that we're seeing is a growth in DNS abuse. And when I use the word DNS abuse, I'm really kind of referring to it in the DNS abuse with a lowercase A, so not necessarily the definition that we have in the contract amendments of only phishing and malware, botnets, etc. I'm talking about any malicious and illegal activity that's being enabled by using domain names. So keep that in mind, we're still going to use the word DNS abuse because it's so ingrained. But we're not talking about just that more narrow definition of DNS abuse.

What we're seeing is what I'm trying to call like a perfect storm. On the one hand, in the first storm cloud, we have the advent of AI. And what is this allowing to go on? You can now spin up a website by going to another website and essentially typing in, "Hey, I've got this domain name, and I want a website to look just like this. The name of it is XYZ," maybe the name of a brand, "and it needs to have this type of quality." So it can really, using generative AI, now you can create a website in seconds. Sometimes you can just do it without having to put any information in, any contact information, sign up for a free trial, and you have a website that is going to look like it was professionally made.

In addition, generative AI is being used to create phishing e-mails. Perhaps it wouldn't be the person's first language, they can now have a much better drafted e-mail to send out. And then we're also seeing some of this fraud, malicious behavior being in the form of chat bots. So all of these AI tools are able to be used for good and for bad, and we're sometimes seeing it used in the DNS abuse setting.

I was doing a little research, and there's one, the Palo Alto Networks was estimating that 40% of all phishing that it found were being website generators were sort of creating the phishing website, that writing assistants were used in approximately 30% in chat bots and almost 11%, so it's at least that one cybersecurity company was seeing a pretty high adoption rate of these tools in DNS abuse.

So let me pause here, because I know Mason also had some stats and some, I guess, information provided on this topic. So, Mason, I'll pause there.

MASON COLE

Thank you, John. Mason Cole, chair of the BC. Thanks again to the Board for entertaining this discussion. It's always a pleasure to be with you. I just want to echo a bit about what John was talking about in terms of velocity of the development of DNS abuse. And I know John said that we're having a conversation, I have to refer to a couple of notes or I'm going to lose track, so forgive me.

As a CSG, and particularly within the BC, we're becoming very concerned about the velocity of development of various forms of DNS abuse. This will be exacerbated by the application of artificial intelligence. On the converse, we're a few months now into one PDP that's going to deal with DNS abuse, and the projected timeline for completion of that at the GNSO level is late 2027. You have a situation where DNS abuse occurs in hours or days, but ICANN policy develops in years. We need as a community to bring those two points much closer together or the system is going to become overwhelmed. So this is no indictment of the PDP or the community's willingness to address abuse per se. It's just an alarm that the velocity problem will overwhelm us if we're not careful.

So, you may be asking, what is the CSG looking for in that regard? That would be, as we've highlighted before, periodic evaluation and an update of DNS abuse definitions as SAC115 called for

several years ago. We've advocated for a GNSO Standing Committee on DNS Abuse, which is much like the one the ccNSO has, and much like the Board Caucus on DNS Abuse. That can inform the GNSO intelligently about abuse risks and help the Council anticipate where to act to mitigate DNS abuse at the policy level. And again, the faster time to response.

So, we're just hoping to bring those two points closer together. Our concern is it will be insufficient over time to deal with lengthy PDPs trying to address short-term threats in the DNS space. Thank you, John.

JOHN MCELWAINE Okay. So we talked a little bit about how part of the perfect storm is the advent of AI and how quickly that can move. The other is a long-standing problem that we've talked about in the past, which is the mass redaction of WHOIS data due to GDPR. So you have this situation where before GDPR, 75% of domain name registrations, you could see the information about the registrant, but now only about 10% of registrations can you get a hold of that information. So you have the situation where you have very little access, of course, to the registrant data.

Combine that with the fact that, because of the same rules, you haven't had the ability to really undertake an accuracy review. You end up having a situation where, if you can get to the information through, for instance, an RDRS request and eventually an SSAD request, the data is likely going to be inaccurate, made-up fake

data. So even if you can get to it, it's going to be hard to action that with what would be typically a demand letter or perhaps litigation.

So with all this, we really wanted to raise those three issues coming together as a trend to really cause problems. Thanks.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thanks, John. I have a couple of my Board colleagues with flags up. I think the points you make in relation to AI and how that's affecting the landscape, affecting the speed and the damage that DNS abuse can do, is very much aligned with some of the discussions we've been having in the Board in relation to our strategy, in relation to the sort of landscape assessment that we're doing and looking at. But I don't want to step on top of what my Board colleague is going to say here. So, Tripti, would you like to take first?

TRIPTI SINHA Well, first I want to say thank you for bringing this forward for discussion. We had the exact same discussion at the Board. The threat landscape has been amplified with artificial intelligence. We're just in a brand new era where DGAs, domain generation algorithms, are beginning to create domains at scale. And not only do they create these at scale, generative AI is teaching them how to be better bad actors. So I feel like we've already got a runaway train on our hands, and we're trying to play catch-up, but I'm very happy to hear that you've got eyes on this. And I think this is a problem

that our ecosystem is going to face. We are facing it right now. It's here. It's just a comment, not a question.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thank you, Tripti. I've got Jim, Greg, Sarah, and then David. And then Philippe. So I think we're getting the conversation we hoped for. Please, Jim.

JIM GALVIN I think that we agree with everything that you're pointing out, and certainly we're aware of all of that. It does not have a straightforward and easy solution. You talk about the speed of getting things done inside of ICANN. There is a topic of efficiency of our processes. The community has a role in doing things efficiently. The PDPs have got to happen quicker and be prioritized in a much different way. The community owns that problem, and you're part of the community, and I know that you are, and you participate in those discussions. We have to continue to evolve that, among other things. As Tripti said, we have on the Board our own discussion these days about efficiency and how we can do things more effectively. Effectively from a speed point of view so that we can be responsive to the community in its recommendations to us and move them along much more quickly.

So we're examining those topics, as well as, as Tripti said, having a technology strategic discussion, disruptive technology, picking on AI in particular. Yes, the Board has been telling itself, this workshop,

we had our own strategic session on technologies and AI, and agentic AI was one of those things which was very dramatic in our discussions. You brought up some great examples of how AI can be used for the bad guys, to make it better—make it worse. They're bad guys, they make it worse, not better.

But I think that we're aware of these concerns. These concerns are visible to us now, and we're thinking about that, and what to do about it is certainly an open question. We would look for comments from you and the community to continue to raise these issues in the community at large, not just with us, as to how we're going to handle these kinds of things.

In the joint session with the CPH, I know that I raised the question of, what does it mean to the CPH overall business models that you can have things happening at a velocity and a speed much greater than anything that we've been built for to date? What do we do about that, if anything? We have to think about the impact of that and what it means. And certainly, it's likely to impact abuse. We don't know exactly how, but that's in front of us too.

So that's, I apologize, a bit of a long-winded way of agreeing with you, telling you that these things are in front of the Board. We are there. We are aware of it. We look for continued dialogue and input from the community. And we need the community to also do its part and continue to raise those concerns within itself and look for solutions to some of these and consider them. Thanks.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Greg, please.

GREG DIBIASE Yeah, all interesting information. I kind of wanted to drill down, Mason, on your proposal about a Standing Committee at the GNSO. So, first question, are you talking about the GNSO Council specifically, or the GNSO more broadly?

MASON COLE Thank you for the question, Greg. I guess it's not fully formed out, the concept, but it would be an advisory function for the Council so that the Council could be informed about developing threats in the DNS space and could then intelligently respond to those with policy.

GREG DIBIASE Thanks. Yes. I like that. We're suggesting something concrete. I'm just thinking through this. So there is a DNS Abuse Team on Council. Like the small team never goes away, necessarily. It just goes into sleep mode. Once issues are identified, the PDP starts. So, for example, there's those two Abuse PDPs right now. When those are done, the Council Small Team presumably spins back up and says, "All right, what do we tackle next?" Is the idea that that is not happening in real… Would it be analogous to that? I'm just trying to wrap my head around that.

MASON COLE

It's a fair question. The question was posed to us earlier today, and the answer that we provided at that point was it's not prescriptive. It might be that the Small Team is better, or it might be that there's a merging of the two functions, or it might be that some kind of advisory function should be put into place for the Council. The idea is that it would make the Council more nimble and more responsive to the abuse threats as they emerge, and not be flat-footed, and could deal with abuse vectors as they develop more efficiently. So I don't want to be overly prescriptive. It's just an idea that we had.

GREG DIBIASE

Sorry. One last thing. So just thinking about that, off the top of my head, maybe the place to start—so there's an abuse issues report, right? But that's static, right? That's not updated every time there's a new vector. So I'm wondering if maybe that is the function we're really thinking about. Because after these two PDPs are going to go back to that issues report. But if something new has happened in the interim—

MASON COLE

You just said what I was going to say, which is something new may happen in the interim that preempts what the Small Team identified as priorities to deal with two years ago, right? There may be a new threat vector that's more pressing. We don't know. We're just trying to be more responsive to the situation.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Okay. Thanks both. Sarah, please.

SARAH DEUTSCH I just wanted to mention another threat vector we've been discussing, which might be something that CSG wants to look into more. But apparently, some of these AI agents have their own little Twitter accounts and are bragging that they are registering domain names on their own and populating them with content, which made me wonder how it would work in the UDRP to show bad faith intent, and whether the argument would be there was no intent because the agent did all the work. So just to add that one to your list to research.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Everyone happy to hear about new, dangerous possibilities. David, please.

DAVID HUGHES Thank you, Chris. So on a related note, perhaps to what Sarah just said, my members, both IPC and even inside IPC, I represent the Coalition for Online Accountability. Historically, because we had access to the WHOIS data, my members could contribute more directly to combating abuse, but now our hands are tied. So I just want to loop that back to what Sarah said. Even if we saw somebody creating content that was infringing on our stuff, we

don't know who they are, so there's nothing we can do about it. So that exacerbates the problem to another level.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thank you. Philippe, please.

PHILIPPE FOUQUART Thank you, Chris. Philippe Fouquart with the ISPCP. Just two comments. First, anecdotally, on the use of AI, our members have struggled with these over the last two years, whereby we would detect abuse in seconds and spend months trying to take a domain name down. And just to illustrate this, the cleverness of those algorithms, whereby now they figure out the sort of semantics associated with the domain names and register one like, for example, you determine that UDRP is associated with ICANN, and then you register icann-udrp.support. I haven't made this up, by the way. And you have an ICANN look-alike website, and all of this in literally seconds, and you take ages to take it down. So we can only testify this.

I want to go back to the Board's question on the trend as a network operator, because to some extent, we've been there, and we know how the story ends. And at least when it was not at such a scale, we've seen a number of cases where it ends in our resolvers. It ends in blocking measures and provisions which do not scale with this sort of new algorithms, and ultimately, talking about emerging trends, obviously, we don't take those decisions ourselves. Those

are regulatory, if not legal, provisions that are defined by the lawmakers. And these are the sort of ideas that are coming up regularly these days because there doesn't seem to be a proper instrument to combat these registrations. Thank you.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thank you. Sajid, please.

SAJID RAHMAN Thanks. And now, since it's almost end of the day. So let me be a bit more provocative. I don't think AI as a technology is a risk. The reason I say that is because—and we have seen this with cybersecurity before, right? So AI is used by bad actors, and there will be good actors who would be using AI to counter those risks. The risk is us humans, our systems, our legal processes, which is too big data to allow the good actors to act. So within our ecosystem, we probably really need to look at what we need to change, which is manual intervention, human intervention. That needs to be updated so that the good actors can actually use AI.

TRIPTI SINHA I agree with you that AI is not fundamentally bad, but there's AI for good, and there's AI for bad. And right now, we're focusing on the bad. But I will tell you where AI has an advantage that we humans don't have, which is that processing speed. We simply don't have that level of speed within inside of us and the ability to process in parallel, so they have an advantage. So for those who are doing

bad, it's going to be hard to stop them unless we begin to create similar AI agents that are out there, scurrying around, looking for them, and killing them. And it's basically another cyber warfare, right?

SAJID RAHMAN

That will happen. I mean, one bit of aside. There is this question of, if you ask an AI agent to make money for you, will it be able to make lot of money? The answer is no, because then there will be other people using other agents to make money, and ultimately it will get down to zero.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE

I think we've had a good discussion. Happy to continue, but I might try and sum up a little. But I had a very quick question, perhaps to Mason, but certainly to anyone in the CSG. You mentioned definitions of AI and the possibility that is laid out or the encouragement to update and review those definitions going forward. But do you see AI as something that requires or drives that need for redefinition, or is it simply that AI is making the current definitions of DNS abuse even more dangerous or prevalent?

MASON COLE

Thanks for the question, Chris. When the SSAC made that recommendation, AI was not mentioned in SAC115, and that was several years ago. So, AI is the newest iteration of a potential source of threat, at least that's how the BC sees it. I don't want to speak for

the SSAC, I'm relying on our interpretation of what that recommendation was—and I'm sure Jim can educate me a bit better on this—but SAC115 said that there's no suitably broad definition of DNS abuse that's ever going to be comprehensive. And we agree with that. We're concerned about it. AI is the newest entry into the both good and bad threat landscape. Our point of view is that ICANN needs to anticipate this and other vectors or the stability of the DNS could be under threat.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thank you for that. Jim, please.

JIM GALVIN With respect to, as the SSAC liaison to the ICANN Board, for context, for those who don't know, SAC115 was not trying to define DNS abuse or the future of that definition. It simply adopted what was in front of the community at that time. So the community itself owns the definition of DNS abuse, and so far, the only consensus position that the community has is on those five things we all are so familiar with and find incomplete often. But nonetheless, I think I want to be careful to also make an important distinction.

Let me try to frame this a little bit differently. I think Tripti started to say this, and certainly Sajid did too. I don't think that AI is a threat in and of itself. Sajid opened with that comment. It's just another tool that's out there by itself, and it can be used in ways that really have a great potential to be a serious problem for us—us, meaning

all of us in this ecosystem—and it's important to really think about that and put that out there.

So, I want to be cautious about the phrase AI is a threat and AI is a risk. It's about the use of that technology and how we apply it. That really does have the potential to be a great risk. Thanks.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Okay. Sarah, please.

SARAH DEUTSCH I would just layer to that that the other issue is that it does become a problem, and we have issues that are unresolved at ICANN that we're still working on, and then the law hasn't caught up with those challenges. That's what we'll be, I guess, debating.

JOHN MCELWAINE I think that the theme was intended to be that not AI is good or evil, but is that it can operate, as Tripti was saying, at such a speed. And as Mason was saying, we don't want that to overwhelm the community with all different sorts of scams, frauds, etc., that can be developed, and I could offline tell you about a few that have been interesting to witness as a practitioner. But one thing that Jim said really kind of resonated with me is that the community owns this problem of not moving quickly enough.

And what I think the CSG—and I hope to not speak necessarily for, because I'm going a bit off script—but would ask for some of that

leadership to have the Board, let the community know that this is important, they need to be moving quicker. I know that you all do say that, but it can be reinforced. And with that type of leadership, I think we can all, as a community, get behind trying to come up with solutions quickly.

I was very heartened listening to Paul McGrady and his work through the new PDP on affiliated domains. But we're still looking at, I think it was 270 days, even if we could solve it in one day, just going through the typical ICANN process. So we also need to be creative, and that does take some bold leadership, not only on the Board, but at the GSO Council level. Thanks.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thanks, John. I think we're probably tying up this issue now. I'm not going to try and summarize everything that we've said. Oh, sorry, Raúl, please.

RAÚL ECHEBERRÍA Just very interesting conversations. Thank you very much for that one. I think that one takeaway for everybody from this this week will be that AI has been present in every discussion, and at least in every meeting that the Board has had with different constituencies and groups. And we don't know yet what will be the impact of the artificial intelligence, either in the function of DNS or the domain name business as a whole. So then one thing that is clear is that is something that we have to continue analyzing permanently, and it

is in the agenda of the Board, as Jim already said, that it was part of the things that we considered during the workshop. And for sure that the community will continue putting this on the table so that it will be a work for everybody.

In terms of security, that is one of the things that was addressed here. I think, AI, the challenge is not only that that AI can be things faster or more efficiently for the benefit of the bad actors. It is that also that we will see things that we cannot anticipate new ways of attack or impact. So, coming back to my points. I think that we have to pay attention, but I don't think there is nothing that we can answer today, and probably if we update the definition of the DNS abuse today, probably that new definition will be obsolete in the end of the year, and probably we will see new things as I say. Thank you.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE To be clear, we're not going to update the definition of DNS abuse today. David, please.

DAVID HUGHES Thank you, Chris. Maybe one of the things that we can think about is exactly how we word our problem statement. And I do agree, in a sense, that AI is not the problem. But AI empowered DNS abuse is completely different than pre-AI empowered abuse, and that is what we have to understand. The speed, it's not just the speed. As somebody else said, it's the fact that we are going to be challenged

with abuse scenarios that nobody has even considered yet, and that will happen so fast. I mean, I don't know what the answer is, but at least we should be framing the question correctly.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thanks, David. Jim?

JIM GALVIN I agree with you completely. Thank you very much for that clarity and putting that out there. And so I want to just call attention to the resiliency panel that we had yesterday, and SSAC's engagement with the Board and its bilateral in this issue. You're exactly right. I mean, the point of resiliency and resilience is to be able to be responsive to things that we just don't know and can't expect. Right now, the way that we run our security and stability, it's very much operationally based. So we know what we're looking for. We know what we're protecting against. We know what to expect. And so we take action against that.

We're entering a new world with AI, as you very articulately said. And I just wanted to call that out and generalize that a little bit. The point here is it's about the trust in the system itself and the dependencies that we don't see and don't know. But unfortunately, AI is much more likely to be able to see and get to before we can as people. So yeah, thank you. And pay attention to the resiliency topic and look for that to become much more prominent going forward in our discussions here. And I encourage

you to check out the recording of that plenary yesterday if you haven't. Thank you.

DAVID HUGHES

Thank you very much, James. I will, for sure. Yeah. And I think you made an additional point, which is that AI will be finding the weaknesses that we don't know about faster than we anticipate.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE

Okay. Thank you all. I certainly took the points about AI being not only a threat and a risk. And I just want to note that there have been, I think, other presentations in other sessions at this meeting already about some of the positive uses of AI in relation to things like Universal Acceptance. And I think also in how we work together as a community, there is clearly a need and an appetite for digging down into what AI is going to mean for this ecosystem, for the technology, for how we work together, how we do that. Digging down, I think, is something to consider. I wonder if sort of plenary session on this might be a useful addition to a future meeting, but certainly we need to talk to our team and org about how to plan that. But there is clearly a need to come at this in a more detailed way and make sure that the community is aware.

I also don't want to completely leave aside the concerns raised about speed and efficiency of policy processes. I think that's something that is also on the Board's mind and that we're focusing on in a number of different ways, the suggestion for how the GNSO

might sort of evolve, I think, is really interesting. I'm not sure it's a Board role to drive that, but I think it's certainly something I'm happy to see that discussion going on and those ideas bouncing around.

And I think in relation to the effectiveness and efficiency of how we work, that probably helps us segue a little bit into the next agenda item, which is looking at the Review of Reviews, and how the CSG is participating in that discussion, and the highlights and priorities you have there. So if that makes sense, John, I'll pass to Philippe.

PHILIPPE FOUQUART Thank you. Philippe Fouquart, speaking for the ISPCP. I suppose I should preface my intervention by saying that, at this point, I'll be talking about our input to the CCG, rather than a sort of joint effort, but noting that we help the GNSO as a whole through our participants in that CCG effort. As you would remember, there are work tracks of buckets, as they call it. One of which is of particular interest to us, which is the Structural Review, which we consider which should be the primary focus of the effort moving forward from our standpoint. The reason for that is more of as a principle than the need to discuss the solution at this point. I'm going to try and describe what I mean by this.

In any corporate structure, there's as of principle, we need to review the organization with a smaller, I mean, obviously. And we don't seem to have that here. We've had a sort of stable structure for years, building up from that. And the reason for this is that we

have to make sure that it actually represents—so in our corporate structures, it's a question of whether we actually represent the interest, the business units, etc., our markets, essentially. In our case, we need to make sure that we are a correct reflection of the ecosystem moving forward. So we think that this should be part of that Structural Review effort. We'll also consider that given the dependencies between the various tracks, that should come first as an effort.

I'm not sure I'm going to go into the detail of what's subject to the outreach at this point. We think that there are elements that are more akin to the Continuous Improvement Program effort. So probably not a need to put that in the same bucket. But maybe I'll stop here. I think moving forward, we'll be providing a new input to the CCG in that spirit, hoping that we can get some traction there. And maybe I should stop here and hand over to you back, Chris or John.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thank you, Philippe. As Board, we're participating with the CCG through two members, Jim and Leon, both of whom are here today. So, perhaps, Leon, can I, through to you, sort of speak a bit about the Board's engagement and where we see priorities. Thank you.

LEON SANCHEZ

Thanks, Chris. Yes. Well, as you are aware, and as Chris has just said, we are participants, full members, Jim and I. I think we try to be clear that the focus coming in from the Board is that we are able to achieve a refreshed set of reviews, a new set of reviews that are mainly lightweight, simple, and whatever the timeline or the cadence is set in this outcome builds in flexibility so that we don't end up where we started. Because we are where we are because we had a huge amount of reviews coming in parallel, overburdening the organization and the volunteers in the community with a huge demand for resources of all types. And what we would like to avoid is to go back to square one.

So, whatever the outcome of the CCG comes to, we would definitely appreciate that. Again, it's as simple as possible that an outsider coming into ICANN is just allowed or able to understand what reviews are meant for, what they do, how they are performed, what is the focus of those reviews, etc.

To your comment on Structural Review, I believe that it's definitely an important topic. But in a way, I find it to be kind of chicken and egg discussion at this point. There remains to be many questions to be answered, and of course, the different members and groups that are participating in CCG have different priorities. So while I read that Structural Review could be a focus for discussion, at the Board level we've also discussed what we do when, for example, in terms of Structural Review, we have a recommendation, and we want to have the review bodies continue to be, in a way, self-determined, so to speak. But if there comes a recommendation

that their structure needs to be altered, and they don't want to take on that recommendation, how do we fix that? How do we actually say, "Well, this is a recommendation coming out from a review. You should definitely implement it." The body that's being suggested to be altered in its form just doesn't want to go along with that. So have you thought about maybe ways in which we could solve that?

PHILIPPE FOUQUART

Thanks. Just the first general comment on the resources. That's a sort of separate topic, but just to say that we fully endorse. Having been in the position to provide representatives to review efforts and having had difficulties in doing so because people were just overloaded, we can only endorse the need to be flexible, especially for Specific Reviews, to make sure that we don't undertake things that we're not even able to staff eventually. So that being said, although we haven't worked, fleshed out this sort of working methods of that Structural Review part, we assume that—well, at first, we assume that we will not start with a solution. We should review the requirements first. And in terms of who and how those recommendations are endorsed, only speaking personally, it is just out of question that there might be recommendations that, for example, from some representatives, that would concern others and not have the consensus of the community as a whole. It wouldn't make sense to sort of force a particular recommendation to people who would not be happy with it.

And certainly, just again, thinking aloud, I would be very much surprised, it's a double negative, but structures in the current structure would not stay the same. If you see what I mean. As in a corporate environment, it doesn't mean that everything has to change because you undertake a Structural Review, but certainly there are things that would need improvement, as well as the processes between interfaces between the structures. But to your first point, there's just no question that if there's no endorsement by the community, something would be forced onto others.

I think that could be fleshed out in terms of, A, the working methods and sort of the approval process of those recommendations. It's not specific to—I mean, you could say that about consensus recommendations as well. So there has to be some consensus around the recommendations, and so that those are not forced to people who would not endorse them.

LEON SANCHEZ: Back to you, Chris. I don't know, maybe—

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE: Thanks. Looking around the table. Certainly there's opportunity here, if anyone else has views on this. Obviously, we're not the CCG so I don't think this is where we're going to make the decisions. But I think the Board is absolutely open and interested to hear perspectives. So thank you, Philippe, for bringing that perspective from ISPCP. And I think we've recognized in our own discussions

that the Structural Review is one of the very difficult and challenging pieces of this whole process, and that there are some very strong feelings in parts of the community that that should be a priority. I think yourself and Leon have really helped illustrate some of the challenges that are going to have to be overcome if we're going to reach that new thing. Philippe, please.

PHILIPPE FOUQUART: Thank you, Chris. And just to follow up on this. I'm thinking aloud, really, but if there's a concern over what you just said, Leon, in terms of forcing recommendations to people who wouldn't agree with them, I'm sure that the CCG may flesh out some principles of that nature for this review to move forward. That's the first thing. And just to repeat what I just said earlier, to us, that's so central. Considering this after the Specific Reviews, for instance, wouldn't really make sense, especially because those reviews will, to some extent, depend on the structure. So let's just take these things in the right order to approach them. Thanks, Chris.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE: Thanks, Philippe. Looking around the table, any other views or thoughts? We have reached the end of our three questions, so we have a very generous AOB possibility here, if anyone wanted to raise any other topics. We find ourselves at the end of the day so that might not be a very appealing invitation. We have Vivek here from the floor, please.

VIVEK GOYAL

Thank you so much. It's more of a statement that I was thinking when we were having the DNS abuse discussion, and I know you cannot have enough DNS abuse discussion. Domain names are actually designed for humans, not for machines. They act as a wrapper to an IP address. Today, we are trying to solve DNS abuse because humans are accessing websites and services built on domain names. We are trying to solve the problems when AI is creating threat which humans are falling for. ICANN deals with names and numbers as Jia-Rong said. Imagine a situation where AI agents are creating threat using IP addresses to fool other AI agents who are doing transactions on your behalf.

We need to change the definition of DNS abuse. This definition of DNS abuse changing is such a prickly thing. Whenever you bring it up, it gets shot down. But we have seen time and time again, we are always in a reactive mode when it comes to the change in technology. Maybe this time, we should stay ahead of the curve and think of how the world will evolve in not more than 18 or 24 months, where I won't need to visit a website, I'll just tell my AI agent to do things for me. And if it goes and accesses a website based on IP address, that is not right and I lose money, then whom do I blame? So I would urge you all, and maybe the CTO office here, to think a little bit more, and maybe this time, stay ahead of the curve. And protect everybody out there, humans and agents both. Thank you.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thank you, Vivek. Yes, Tripti, please.

TRIPTI SINHA Now, I have an idea. Let's go ask some LLM how to do it. I'm being facetious.

MICHAEL GRAHAM Hi. Michael Graham, I'm treasurer of IPC, and I don't know if this is the appropriate place to bring it up, but I think it is. During the week, and coming out of the leadership program, which another colleague from that is at the table, which was an excellent program. But one of the things that we discussed was building bridges and how to do that, that the problem, in a lot of cases, is the language we use, the approaches that we take. One of the huge issues, of course, that remains and comes up all the time is the application and the consideration of human rights in all of the policy development processes and basically all of ICANN processes.

Unfortunately, that term is too often limited to privacy. And one thing that we have been discussing internally, and I just want to bring to the attention of the Board and maybe get your reactions, some of which I've seen earlier this week, is the fact that human rights includes more rights than simply privacy, including the rights to avoid things like fraud, things that would steal your property, and that in any human rights analysis, there needs to be a balance between all of the human rights. In fact, Article 28 says, "All human rights must be considered." I just wonder if maybe this is a question

for members of the Board, if this is something that you've also discussed and are concerned with, or if there's something that we need to discuss further. Thanks.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thank you for that. I'm looking around to my Board colleagues to see if anyone is keen to jump on this one. Sarah, please.

SARAH DEUTSCH I think you're right, Michael, the Declaration of Human Rights has all sorts of rights in it, and it does say it needs to be balanced. And if I'm remembering correctly, ICANN's policy also talks about balancing, but I don't have that in front of me.

CHRIS BUCKRIDGE Thanks, Sarah. Okay. I think it definitely an important point for consideration. And as Sarah says, I think it's something we have discussed as a Board, but it's important to have it highlighted and reminded to us. So thank you for that.

Okay. In that case, I'm going to say thank you to John for helping me chair this, and thank you to everyone, and I'm going to hand back to Tripti.

TRIPTI SINHA Thank you, Chris, and thank you for the discussion. I thought was a very good discussion. I must share about some of last year I was in a meeting, not ICANN, in my day job, and someone said, "Have you

noticed AI has become a verb?" and it really has. We AI'd a lot today, and I think we will continue to AI.

Vivek, where are you? I wasn't being facetious, per se, but you're absolutely right. The threat landscape has shifted. Unique Identifiers are being used in various ways, whether it be names or numbers. It's a new era. I talked about the inflection point in my opening address, and I was referring to exactly this.

On that note, let's conclude this meeting, and thank you very much. This meeting is adjourned.

**[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]**