

# QUANTUM THREAT, INTERNET TRUST

Planning the DNSSEC and RPKI Transition to  
PQC over the Next Decade



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85 | COMMUNITY  
FORUM

MUMBAI



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MAKING THE INTERNET  
MORE SECURE AND SAFER

# Roadmap

- 1 Why now
- 2 Why us
- 3 Research findings
- 4 What comes next

# PQC: today's challenge

1

We don't know when a capable quantum computer will appear

2

Transition time is really long

3

The DNSSEC transition taught us about how hard it is



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The following maps provide a view into global DNSSEC deployment and break the deployment status of top-level domains (TLDs) out into six stages:

# DNSSEC

Select Region  
World



Animate

2005


2026

## General Statistics

Total ccTLD's

183

|   |               |    |     |
|---|---------------|----|-----|
| ● | Unsigned      | 2  | 1%  |
| ● | Experimental  | 9  | 5%  |
| ● | Announced     | 4  | 2%  |
| ● | Partial       | 9  | 5%  |
| ● | DS in Root    | 69 | 38% |
| ● | Operational   | 83 | 45% |
| ● | DS Automation | 7  | 4%  |



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# What is quantum-unsafe



Mandate  
secure-by-design &  
SBOM in procurement



Harmonise global  
labelling & certification  
for consumer trust



Invest in lightweight PQC R&D  
& secure OTA infrastructure




Launch user education &  
automated patch programmes





# WHAT IS QUANTUM- UNSAFE?

public-key  
cryptography



3. DNS Security Algorithm Numbers Registry Column Values

Initial values for the use and implementation recommendation columns in the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" registry under the "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers" registry group are shown in Table 2.

When there are multiple RECOMMENDED algorithms in the "Use for" columns, operators should choose the best algorithm according to local policy.

| No. | Mnemonics          | Use for<br>DNSSEC<br>Signing | Use for<br>DNSSEC<br>Validation | Implement<br>for DNSSEC<br>Signing | Implement<br>for DNSSEC<br>Validation |
|-----|--------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1   | RSAMD5             | MUST NOT                     | MUST NOT                        | MUST NOT                           | MUST NOT                              |
| 3   | DSA                | MUST NOT                     | MUST NOT                        | MUST NOT                           | MUST NOT                              |
| 5   | RSASHA1            | NOT<br>RECOMMENDED           | RECOMMENDED                     | NOT<br>RECOMMENDED                 | MUST                                  |
| 6   | DSA-NSEC3-SHA1     | MUST NOT                     | MUST NOT                        | MUST NOT                           | MUST NOT                              |
| 7   | RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 | NOT<br>RECOMMENDED           | RECOMMENDED                     | NOT<br>RECOMMENDED                 | MUST                                  |
| 8   | RSASHA256          | RECOMMENDED                  | RECOMMENDED                     | MUST                               | MUST                                  |
| 10  | RSASHA512          | NOT<br>RECOMMENDED           | RECOMMENDED                     | NOT<br>RECOMMENDED                 | MUST                                  |
| 12  | ECC-GOST           | MUST NOT                     | MAY                             | MUST NOT                           | MAY                                   |
| 13  | ECDSAP256SHA256    | RECOMMENDED                  | RECOMMENDED                     | MUST                               | MUST                                  |
| 14  | ECDSAP384SHA384    | MAY                          | RECOMMENDED                     | MAY                                | RECOMMENDED                           |
| 15  | ED25519            | RECOMMENDED                  | RECOMMENDED                     | RECOMMENDED                        | RECOMMENDED                           |
| 16  | ED448              | MAY                          | RECOMMENDED                     | MAY                                | RECOMMENDED                           |
| 17  | SM2SM3             | MAY                          | MAY                             | MAY                                | MAY                                   |
| 23  | ECC-GOST12         | MAY                          | MAY                             | MAY                                | MAY                                   |
| 253 | PRIVATEDNS         | MAY                          | MAY                             | MAY                                | MAY                                   |
| 254 | PRIVATEOID         | MAY                          | MAY                             | MAY                                | MAY                                   |

Table 2: Initial Values for the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers Registry Columns

# DNSSEC needs to change all algorithms

- 1 zone signing
- 2 validation chain



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www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7935.txt

## 2. Algorithms

Two cryptographic algorithms are used in the RPKI:

- \* The signature algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, CMS signed objects, and certification requests is RSA Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 Version 1.5 (sometimes referred to as "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5") from Section 8.2 of [RFC3447].

Huston & Michaelson Standards Track [Page 3]  
RFC 7935 RPKI Algorithm Profile August 2016

- \* The hashing algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, CMS signed objects and certification requests is SHA-256 [SHS] (see note below).

NOTE: The exception is the use of SHA-1 [SHS] when CAs generate authority and subject key identifiers [RFC6487].

In certificates, CRLs, and certification requests the hashing and digital signature algorithms are identified together, i.e., "RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 with SHA-256" or more simply "RSA with SHA-256". The Object Identifier (OID) sha256WithRSAEncryption from [RFC4055] MUST be used in these products.

# RPKI needs to change the sign algorithm

1 certificates

2 CRLs

3 ROAs

4 manifests



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# Challenges

## Operational transition

1

Secure migration

2

Interoperable migration

3

Live environments

4

No trust breakage

5

CPU usage

5

Network usage



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our report



# IS3C/Afnic research: governance findings

## US

- top-down
- mandate-driven
- NIST-led

## EU

- coordination-driven
- member-state alignment
- hybrid emphasis

## National initiatives

- France
- Germany
- Netherlands



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# What comes next



Two working groups:

1. DNS
2. Routing

Join us as:



1. Expert
2. Sponsor

- 1 map dependencies
- 2 identify blockers
- 3 test assumptions
- 4 improve interoperability
- 5 connect standards + operations



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# Q&A



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