


# Rates of HTTPS misconfiguration VS DNSSEC misconfiguration

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The following graph shows the percentage of observed zones with a DNSKEY RRset that is failing to validate.



# DNSSEC is error-prone. How much?

- 1–2% of DNSSEC-enabled domains
- Many possible reasons:
  - DS RRset points to non-existing keys only
  - Wrong signatures (operator failure: key confusion, ...)
  - Expired signatures
  - Missing signatures
  - ...


```
$ dig @8.8.8.8 dnssec-failed.org

; <<>> DiG 9.18.39-0ubuntu0.24.04.3-Ubuntu <<>> @8.8.8.8 dnssec-failed.org
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 31432
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags;; udp: 512
; EDE: 9 (DNSKEY Missing): (No DNSKEY matches DS RRs of dnssec-failed.org)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;dnssec-failed.org.                IN      A
```

# HTTPS is error-prone. How much?

- ?-?% of HTTPS-enabled domains
- Many possible reasons:
  - Wrong domain name in certificate
  - Intermediate certificates missing from handshake
  - Unknown CA
  - Expired certificate
  - Unsupported cipher
  - Wrong key/certificate pinned
  - ...
- Used to be more common!



# Inputs

- Sample: CrUX Top Million (via <https://github.com/zakird/crux-top-lists>)

*“Websites are ranked by completed pageloads (measured by First Contentful Paint) and aggregated by web origin. The dataset adheres as closely as possible to user-initiated pageloads (e.g., it excludes traffic from iframes).”*

- Simulate real browser behavior by mixing in intermediates (via <https://github.com/FiloSottile/intermediates>)

*“a list of known unexpired, unrevoked intermediate certificates chaining to [...] the Mozilla Root Program. [...] useful to establish connections to misconfigured servers that fail to provide a full certificate chain but provide a valid, publicly trusted end-entity certificate. Some browsers implement similar strategies to successfully establish connections to these sites.”*

# Measurement

For any domain on the CrUX list,


- perform TLS handshake on port 443
- record outcome (OK/expired/unkown\_ca/name\_mismatch/tls\_other/conn\_fail)

... both for OS trust store only, and with intermediates mixed in


- Measurements conducted on April 29, 2026
- Aggregated by eTLD (effective TLD = public suffix)

## HTTPS outcome distribution — top 1M CrUX origins


### Without intermediates




### + intermediates




### Failure mode detail — zoomed in (w/o vs. +intermediates)




HTTPS failure rates by eTLD and failure type (w/o intermediates)  
Linear scale — top 20 eTLDs by total volume



Absolute failure counts by eTLD and failure type (w/o intermediates)  
Log scale — top 20 eTLDs by total volume



### Impact of intermediates on unknown\_ca failures Top 25 eTLDs by unknown\_ca rate — each line shows the drop



# HTTPS is error-prone. How much?

- 1-2% of HTTPS-enabled domains

- Many possible reasons:

- Wrong domain name in certificate
- Intermediate certificate missing from handshake
- Unknown CA
- Expired certificate
- Unsupported cipher
- Wrong key/certificate pair
- ...

- Used to be more common

## DNSSEC is error-prone. How much?

- 1-2% of DNSSEC-enabled domains
- Many possible reasons:
  - DS RRset points to non-existing keys only
  - Wrong signatures (operator failure: key confusion, ...)
  - Expired signatures
  - Missing signatures
  - ...

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# HTTPS ≠ DNSSEC

- Not making any claims about impact
- Not suggesting that a DNSSEC failure is like an HTTPS failure
  - DNSSEC misconfiguration in a TLD typically is like a CA or intermediate failing
- Adding data points to the discussion

# Questions

- Is this useful?

If yes,

- Should there be stats over time?
  - Anyone dare to place a bet on automation impact?
- How to improve the measurement?