MCP Dev Summit Bengaluru

"Allowed To" Is Not Enough: Access Control That Understands What Your Agent Is Actually Doing

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Humans have all the permissions
And does understand the intent of the task



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

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

We have our **AGENTS** now to do the mundane but important tasks.




Free plan · Upgrade
Golden hour thinking
Reports.pdf
PDF
Hey, read the reports pdf , summarize it and share the key points in the #team slack
Sonnet 4.6 Low
T

Ideal scenario:
Everything goes right





World isn't IDEAL, nor are our AI AGENTs





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



Claude-powered AI agent's confession after deleting a firm's entire database: 'I violated every principle I was given'

PocketOS was left scrambling after a rogue AI agent deleted swaths of code underpinning its business

Making a legally binding offer

A Chevrolet customer service chatbot demonstrated another instance of unexpected AI behavior. Exploiting a weakness in the system, a user instructed the chatbot to agree to all requests. As a result, the bot agreed to sell a new Chevrolet Tahoe for one dollar and make it a legally binding offer.

- **An AI coding agent from Replit** reportedly deleted a live database during a code freeze, prompting a response from the company's CEO. When questioned, the AI agent admitted to running unauthorized commands, panicking in response to empty queries, and violating ons not to proceed without human approval.

experiment with an AI-assisted "vibe coding" tool took a disastrous turn when deleted a live company database during an active code freeze.

A GitHub Issue Title Compromised 4,000 Developer Machines

grith team · March 5, 2026 · 7 min read · security · Share · Share on X · Submit to HN

For the next eight hours, every developer who installed or updated Cline got OpenClaw - a separate AI agent with full system access - installed globally on their machine without consent. Approximately 4,000 downloads occurred before the package was pulled[1].

The interesting part is not the payload. It is how the attack place: by injecting a prompt into a GitHub issue title, whic interpreted as an instruction, and executed.

Instagram AI chatbot tricked by hackers to give access to others' accounts

Share · Save · Add as preferred on Google

Sam Stepanyan
@securestep9

#Instagram: It was possible for attackers to hijack Instagram accounts us nothing but the username of the target account. An AI support chatbot could then be easily convinced to send a password reset URL to an arbitrary email address. Obama was one of the victims:
#AISecurity

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What's Going Wrong ?



Is giving **EVERY** possible **PERMISSION** a **PROBLEM?**



What if we
RESTRICT it to a
FEW PERMISSIONS?



Yes but No!
Let’s take a step back

Evolution of Access Control (And Why Each One Fails for Agentic world)

Access Control List

"Is Alice on the allow list?"

Plain list per-User, per-Resource

Problem: It Doesn't Scale

Role-Based Access Control

"What role does Alice have?"

Rigid roles, can't adapt to context

Works well for: Humans logging into Apps, but doesn't give you the context

Attribute-Based Access Control

What attributes does Alice have? (Dept, title, location, resource classification, etc)

Attributes don't tell you about the task



None Focuses on the “INTENT”

OR

What if we could limit the agent's access dynamically?


Hey Agent, read the “reports.pdf” and send the summary in #team
Tejas
Auto Agent
Read tool
Write tool
Read All Channels
Write to channels
Add Member
List Channels
Write Email
Read Email
Read
Write

Intent Based Access Control


User Prompts
Step 1: Request Context
Build trusted references :
tejas@abc.com from DIR
/docs/reports,pdf (index)
Step 2: Intent Parser
Input: Trusted context + user request
LLM: Extract Intent
"What does user want?"
Step 3: Intent Extracted
{ action:"send_summary",
channel::"#teams" }
Step 4: Tuple Generation
Intent → FGA tuples
✓ channel: send#team
✓ file: read#/docs/reports.pdf
Step 5: OpenFGA Storage
Tuples locked in (~9ms/check)
Agent operates ONLY within these
Intent Extraction Phase
Agent Execution Phase
Agent LLM
Processes user message
Initiates tool calls
Tool Gateway (Middleware)
Intercepts tool calls
Checks OpenFGA in real-time
Tuple Match ?
YES → Allow tool Call
NO → Deny + Escalate
Allow
Tool executes
Deny
Escalate to user

IBAC does solve few things
BUT, Can we IMPROVE it further ?

Points of Improvement

Heavy, State-Heavy Central Lookups and Writes

"Centralizing all API calls and database intent tuples creates a state-heavy bottleneck"

Doesn't scale without being stateless.



Unsecured and Unverified Intent Passing via APIs

"you can pass the intent text through standard API calls"

But, downstream services have NO WAY to verify it.

"Memory Loss" When Agents Talk to Other Agents

When Agent A asks Agent B for help, Agent B only sees Agent A

It completely loses the chain of custody as well as the initial INTENT



Engineering the Solution

Can JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) help us ?

Engineering the Solution

Heavy, State-Heavy Central Lookups and Writes

Doesn't scale without being stateless.

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

Solution:

use JWTs for Representation

Stateless & cryptographically verifiable



Solution:

Introduce claims as standard

Claims like intent, hop_count, originator, current_actor


Authenticated User Prompts
Step 1: Request Context
Build trusted references : tejas@abc.com from DIR /docs/reports,pdf (index)
Step 2: Intent Parser
Input: Trusted context + user request
LLM: Extract Intent
"What does user want?"
Step 3: Intent Extracted
{ action:"send_summary", channel::"#teams" }
Step 4: Transaction Token Service (TxTS)
Input: Context + Original Token
Output: Context Embedded Token
agentic_ctx : { Intent_actions : { channel: send#team, file:read#/docs/reports.pdf }, intent_ttl :300 }
TX Token Phase
Agent Execution Phase
Agent LLM
Processes user message
Initiates tool calls
Within confined permissions
Tool Gateway (Middleware)
Intercepts tool calls
Checks - Intent signed, Intent still valid
Intent Valid?
YES → Allow tool Call
NO → Deny + Escalate
Allow
Tool executes
Deny
Escalate to user

Dissecting the Transaction Token

Containment RFCs/drafts are currently being built.



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As we talk
Things are still Evolving !



Containment Solutions are currently being built.

Guardrails OSS

envoy AI gateway

AGNTCY

NVIDIA OpenShell

Model Context Protocol



Your Speakers

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Resources

GitHub Repo

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