



**MCP**  
Dev Summit  
Mumbai

# Operationalizing MCP: Security, Control planes and Risk Governance



# AGENDA

## SPEAKER

Sagar Dashora

AI/ML Lead, JPMorgan Chase

AAIF WG member -

- Security & Privacy
- Identity & Trust
- Governance and Compliance

- Why MCP changes enterprise risk
- Registry at the core of control plane
- Identity as the building block
- Capability graphs
- Risk tiering and lethal trifecta
- MCP proxy pattern
- MCP Risk → Enterprise Architecture Mapping

## WHY MCP CHANGES ENTERPRISE RISK

- Identity
- Trust
- Authorization
- Data Protection
- Governance
- Auditability

- Traditional API Risk Model: Application → Known APIs
- MCP Risk Model: Agent → Discovers Tools → Invokes Tools → Combines Results → Makes Decisions
- Key risks: dynamic discovery, agent autonomy, cross-system execution, emergent attack paths
- Risk surface is now a graph of agents, tools, identities, and runtime decisions.

# MCP THREAT MODEL

- Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure
- Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep
- Tool Poisoning
- Software Supply Chain Attacks & Dependency Tampering
- Command Injection & Execution
- Intent Flow Subversion
- Insufficient Authentication & Authorization
- Lack of Audit and Telemetry
- Shadow MCP Servers
- Context Injection & Over-Sharing



# REGISTRY CENTRIC CONTROL PLANE

*The directory isn't just a catalog – it's the building block of control plane that enforces governance, identity, and security across the MCP ecosystem.*

- Prevents *rogue MCPs* and *shadow deployments*
- Ensures *ownership verification* and *security classification*
- Enables *policy enforcement* and *identity management*
- Integrates with enterprise CMDB for auditability and governance



# EVOLUTION OF AN ENTERPRISE REGISTRY


The maturity of an MCP platform is determined by how high up the stack governance decisions are made.



## What is allowed

### Governance and Policy

- Policy Engine
- Risk Tiering
- Capability Graph
- Agent Scopes



## Who can connect

### Connectivity Control

- Identity / authentication
- Traffic policies
- Proxy and Gateway
- Secure communications
- Service mesh (Istio, Linkerd)



## What exists

### Discovery and Registration

- Inventory
- Metadata
- Discovery API
- Versioning

# IDENTITY MANAGEMENT



## Service Identity

MCP trusts the platform

Individual agents do not have separate identity

Simplest operational model

Difficult to enforce per-agent authorization

## Agent Identity

Every agent authenticates independently

MCP authorizes individual agents

Fine-grained access control

Requires pre-defined logical agent identities

## Workload Identity

Identity tied to runtime execution

Implemented through mTLS or workload certificates

Strong cryptographic trust

More operational complexity

# IDENTITY MANAGEMENT – DELEGATED IDENTITY



## Token Forwarding

Simple implementation

No token exchange required

Anti-pattern in most cases

## OBO Token Exchange

Supported by major IdPs

Fine-grained scopes and consent


Strong auditability

Token propagation across multiple hops can become complex

# DELEGATED IDENTITY WITH CONTROL PLANE BOUND SCOPES


*If we could have an overlap of human identity and agent identity*

- Every actor requests OBO(on-behalf-of) tokens
- ID provider generates token with claims of original id and actor.
- Tokens with overlapping scopes from both actor and id
- ID provider and registry planes are synced
- ✓ Preserves full accountability chain
- ✓ Better auditability than token forwarding
- Requires changes in IDP level
- Need sync between IDP and control plane




# CAPABILITY GRAPHS

An agent's security boundary is determined by the tools and capabilities available within its universe.




# AGENT RISK TIERING AND LETHAL TRIFECTA

Agent risk is a non-binary decision, capability graphs come to rescue



## The Lethal Trifecta

by Simon Willison



# IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE THE RISK

*Agent risk is a non-binary decision, capability graphs come to rescue*



Tier	Examples	Risk
Tier 0	Documentation Q&A	Low
Tier 1	JIRA and confluence Agent	Medium
Tier 2	Internal Workflow agent	High
Tier 3	External facing Client Support agent	Trifecta

## Architecture Controls

- Identity-aware authorization
- Capability graph enforcement
- External MCP gateway
- Human approval workflows
- Risk-based execution policies

# GATEWAY FOR EXTERNAL MCP

Enterprise Registry-Controlled Access to MCPs outside the enterprise



**FASTMCP**

**Gravitee**

**MCPProxy**

**truefoundry**

# MCP RISK → ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE MAPPING

MCP Risk	Primary Architecture Control
<b>MCP01: Token Mismanagement &amp; Secret Exposure</b>	Identity Plane, Workload Identity, Secretless Authentication
<b>MCP02: Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep</b>	Policy Enforcement, Capability Graph Analysis
<b>MCP03: Tool Poisoning</b>	MCP Registry, Approval Workflow, Tool Certification
<b>MCP04: Supply Chain Attacks &amp; Dependency Tampering</b>	Runtime Governance, Artifact Validation, Provenance Controls
<b>MCP05: Command Injection &amp; Execution</b>	Execution Controls, Sandboxing, Policy Enforcement
<b>MCP06: Intent Flow Subversion</b>	Intent Governance, Policy Engine, Approval Gates
<b>MCP07: Insufficient Authentication &amp; Authorization</b>	Identity-Aware Control Plane, AuthN/AuthZ Layer
<b>MCP08: Lack of Audit &amp; Telemetry</b>	Audit Pipeline, Observability Plane, Trace Correlation
<b>MCP09: Shadow MCP Servers</b>	Discovery Registry, Registration Controls, Ownership Tracking
<b>MCP10: Context Injection &amp; Over-Sharing</b>	Context Firewall, External MCP Proxy, Data Governance

# THE DREAM ...

**SecureAI**

- Overview
- Agents**
- Tools (MCP)
- Auth Policies
- Activity
- Risks
- Settings

**AD** Alice Dev  
Platform Admin

Agents > DataAnalyst Pro >

Edit Agent



## DataAnalyst Pro Active

AI agent that helps users analyze data, generate insights, and create reports from business datasets.

Agent ID  
agt\_8f3c2a7e

Created  
May 12, 2025

Last Updated  
May 20, 2025

### Risk Tier

Medium

Explain Tiering

Medium risk due to access to sensitive business data via data warehouse tools and report export capabilities.

### Contact Team

**DA** Data Analytics Team  
data-analytics@company.com

### Owners

**SK** Sarah Kim  
sarah.kim@company.com

**MJ** Michael Johnson  
michael.johnson@company.com

### MCP Tools Access

- Snowflake (Read Only) Read
- BigQuery (Read Only) Read
- Looker (Query) Read
- S3 (Read Only) Read
- Slack (Read) Read

View all 5 tools

### Auth Policy

**DataAnalyst Policy v2** Active

- MFA required
- Least privilege access
- Session timeout: 60 min
- No data exfiltration tools

View policy details

### LLM Tokens & Cost (Last 7 Days)

Total Tokens	Input Tokens	Output Tokens
<b>1,248,530</b>	<b>832,140</b>	<b>416,390</b>
<span>↑ 18.6% vs prior 7 days</span>		
Total Cost	Cost per 1K Tokens	
<b>\$24.67</b>	<b>\$0.0198</b>	
<span>↑ 14.3% vs prior 7 days</span>		

View usage analytics

### Models Used

- GPT-4o Primary
- Claude 3.5 Sonnet Fallback
- text-embedding-3-large Embeddings

View model usage

### Recent Actions

Time	Action	Tool	Result
May 20, 2025 10:42 AM	Queried dataset	Snowflake	Success
May 20, 2025 10:35 AM	Generated report	Looker	Success
May 20, 2025 10:28 AM	Read data	BigQuery	Success
May 20, 2025 10:15 AM	Exported report	S3	Success
May 20, 2025 10:01 AM	Posted summary	Slack	Success

View all activity

### Blocked Actions

Time	Action Attempted	Tool	Reason
May 20, 2025 10:50 AM	Delete table	Snowflake	Action not allowed by policy
May 20, 2025 10:37 AM	Write data	BigQuery	Insufficient permissions
May 20, 2025 10:22 AM	Access emails	Gmail	Tool not allowed by policy
May 20, 2025 10:05 AM	Upload file	S3	Write access not permitted
May 20, 2025 09:58 AM	Run DDL query	Snowflake	Action not allowed by policy

View all blocked attempts



**THANK YOU**

