A decorative border with ornate floral and scrollwork patterns in a light brown color, framing the entire slide content.

# Uncouth users, dopey developers, and crazy cryptographers

---

Why it's **never** the security architect's fault

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OSS-NA 2026  
Mike Bursell & CRob

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# 01

# Introductions

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Wherein the audience meets our key players....

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# Who are these guys?



Mike

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Executive Director, Confidential Computing Consortium

Author, ex-founder, geek, ex-CEO, single malt enthusiast, West Wing aficionado, "Abu el Banat"



CRob

---

OpenSSF CTO & Chief Security Architect

`# chmod 666 /rob/`

44th level Dungeon Master

27th level Securityologist

# We're Architects

We're both Security Architects



Image [source](#)

...but we're not the same type of security architect!

# We're Architects

Mike is a System Architect  
(with a spicy dash of solution architecture)

CRob is an Operations Architect  
(with a heaping helping of IAM and GRC)



Image [source](#)

We **OBVIOUSLY** hold each other in utter contempt (boo hiss)

But not as much as that we reserve for people who are **NOT** security architects (those *people* are JUST THE WORST!)



# 02




# Architect?

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Where the audience learns we do not draw buildings and bridges all day long

---

Or *DO* we?



“But I assumed that all architects were the same...”

Architecture is:

90% problem  
solving

10% creativity

13% maths



- Coffee with an Architect

Image [source](#)

*POPPYCOCK! What a foolish notion!*

There are lots of different types of architects!

Application, solution, system, enterprise, operational ... and even within those, there are differences

...and security specialisms across each

# You need security EVERYWHERE!



## Silos

Point solutions  
Islands of identity & data  
Duplicative tools

Siloing doesn't help



So many security  
frameworks to choose  
from!

TOGAF  
UML views  
SABSA  
MITRE  
Zachman  
UAF  
WoW  
LoTR





## DON'T PANIC

It's tricky, and that's why  
we're the cleverest, best  
educated and, let's face  
it, sexiest folks in IT.

# Why do we *NEED* architects?

## Abstractions

- You can't know all the details (and it was getting out of control)
- Most folks look at one layer (hopefully) know it well
- But as you combine many layers, emergent properties only exist as complex interactions. That's why you need architects.



The image features a decorative border with floral motifs in the corners and midpoints of the top and bottom edges. The main text is centered within this border.

# Getting the picture yet?

Get it? “Picture”? We amuse ourselves


## Architects: “we got skillz”

Operations are about business, resilience, risk and continuity. C-level folks don't care about security (even CISOs) - they care about covering their ...

... risk.

Most security folks are trained to start with the “no”. This doesn't go down well with the C-levels.



Architects start with “*probably no, but pay us lots and we'll find a maybe*”.





# 03

## The interesting people we get to work with



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Wherein we take the order from the Customer and give it to the Engineers!

---

We've got PEOPLE SKILLS!!!



# A Taxonomy of selected personae

Who?	What do they do wrong?	What should they do?
Users	Stupidity	
Engineers	Don't do security	
Security engineers	Only think about their domain	
Cryptographers		
Testers		
Ops folks		
Product managers		
Executives		
Security architects		

# A Taxonomy of selected personae

Who?	What do they do wrong?	What should they do?
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Testers	Assume that unit test pass = secure	
Ops folks	Believe that once it's deployed, it's good	
Product managers	Increase security technical debt	
Executives		
Security architects		

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Executives	Deprioritise security over sales	
Security architects	Absolutely nothing	

# A Taxonomy of selected personae

Who?	What do they do wrong?	What should they do?
Users	Stupidity	Don't use our code/RTFM
Engineers	Don't do security	Learn to do security, at least in their domain
Security engineers	Only think about their domain	Realise that their code is part of a system
Cryptographers	Believe that mathematics fixes everything	Understand that (most) systems involve (fallible) people
Testers	Assume that unit test pass = secure	Look at how multiple components interact
Ops folks	Believe that once it's deployed, it's good	Think about how software has an attack lifecycle
Product managers	Increase security technical debt	Put security into every release
Executives	Deprioritise security over sales	Spend more money on security
Security architects	Absolutely nothing	Keep up the great work of understanding everything!!

# An UPDATED Taxonomy of selected personae

Who?	What do they do wrong?	What should they do?
Users	Stupidity	Don't use our code/RTFM
Engineers	Don't do security	Talk to a security architect
Security engineers	Only think about their domain	Talk to a security architect
Cryptographers	Believe that mathematics fixes everything	Talk to a security architect
Testers	Assume that unit test pass = secure	Talk to a security architect
Ops folks	Believe that once it's deployed, it's good	Talk to a security architect
Product managers	Increase security technical debt	Talk to a security architect
Executives	Deprioritise security over sales	Spend more money on security
Security architects	Absolutely nothing	Keep up the great work of understanding everything!! <3

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Executives	Deprioritise security over sales	Spend more money on security <b>architects</b>
Security architects	Absolutely nothing	Keep up the great work of understanding everything!! <3




# 04

## The Unbearable Lightness of Being an Architect

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Wherein our heroes explain what they ACTUALLY do

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A (necessary) digression

# Why open source is better than anything else

“Open source is the worst form of code, except for all the others” ( Winston Churchill)

- If you can't see it, you can't fix it
- Proprietary == just your own experts
- Open source == a whole world of experts (if they're interested/incentivi[s|z]ed)
  - “All bugs are shallow” **only** counts if you have relevant people who actually check
- If no-one else fixes it, you can (but be careful!)






But now, more importantly... Back to the Architects!

# Why ~~open source~~ architects are better than ~~anything~~ everyone else

“Architects are the worst form of security folks, except for all the others” (Winston Churchill)

The wider context requires multiple views and viewpoints to see the wider picture and address different stakeholders' requirements, allowing them to be able to take the right actions.



# So what is it...you say you DO here?



Image [source](#)

- Circles and Boxes
- L33T Powerpointing
- Fancy Waistcoats
- Ivory Towers
- Brilliant Insights
- Scathing Wit

# So what is it...you say you DO here?




Image [source](#)

But seriously...

Understanding security principles and knowing how to apply them is a complex set of skills that takes time to learn








# 05

## Conclusions?




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Wherein our heroes get to the actual point

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# A few take-aways



# ...But Seriously(ish)

Think bigger...

# ...But Seriously(ish)

Think bigger...

...bridge communities

# ...But Seriously(ish)

Think bigger...

...bridge communities

...talk the language of your audience

# ...But Seriously(ish)

Think bigger...

...bridge communities

...talk the language of your audience

...see the bigger picture (and it keeps expanding)

# ...But Seriously(ish)

Think bigger...

...bridge communities

...talk the language of your audience

...see the bigger picture (and it keeps expanding)

... but be able to understand the lower level tech stuff (or able to fake it sufficiently)

# ...But Seriously(ish)

Think bigger...

~~...bridge communities~~


~~...talk the language of your audience~~

~~...see the bigger picture (and it keeps expanding)~~

~~... but be able to understand the lower level tech stuff (or able to fake it sufficiently)~~

... salaries for security architects

# Thank you very much for your attention!



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<https://github.com/SecurityCRob>



<https://github.com/MikeCamel>



[What is CyberSecurity?](#)



[The Security Unhappy Hour,  
Chips & Salsa  
What's in the SOSS?](#)



<https://www.linkedin.com/in/mikebursell/>



<https://www.linkedin.com/in/darthcrob/>

**CREDITS:** This presentation template was created by **Slidesgo**, and includes icons by **Flaticon**, and infographics & images by **Freepik**



06



# Resources



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A Catalogue of Interesting Things to Have Languishing on Your Shelf  
to Both Gaze Upon and Perhaps Someday Read

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# Good Reads

Ross Anderson *Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems*

Eduardo B. Fernandez *Security Patterns in Practice*

Rick Howard *CyberSecurity First Principles*

Jerome Saltzer and Michael Schroeder *The Protection of Information in Computer Systems*

Brook S. E. Schoenfield *Secrets of a Cyber Security Architect*

Brook S. E. Schoenfield *Securing Systems - Applied Security Architecture and Threat Models*

John Sherwood, Andrew Clark, and David Lyman *Enterprise Security Architecture*

Diomedis Spinellis and Georgios Gousios *Beautiful Architecture: Leading Thinkers Reveal the Hidden Beauty in Software Design*

Stephen Wahe *Open Enterprise Security Architecture*