

서울

From CVEs to Compliance: Automating Embedded Linux Kernel Security

Kyungsik Lee
LG Electronics



Contents

- Why Security Response Matters
- The Reality of Kernel Maintenance
- What We Can Automate
- A Proposed Vulnerability Response Pipeline
- When Automation Meets Reality

Why Security Response Now Matters

EU CRA

- Secure development and vulnerability handling throughout the product lifecycle

UK PSTI


- Security requirements for consumer connected products

Cybersecurity Labels

- Security labels help buyers identify more secure products

Security response is now an ongoing engineering process.

EU CRA: Timeline Pressure




Prepare the response process before the reporting clock starts.

CVE Volume Growth


AI is accelerating vulnerability discovery

- AI-assisted fuzzing and code analysis find more vulnerabilities
- Security researchers now use AI agents to discover bugs at scale




Embedded Linux Maintenance Reality

- 📺 Products often ship for 5-10+ years
- 🔧 Vendor customizations make kernel upgrades expensive
- 📈 Upstream support eventually ends
- ⚠️ Security maintenance continues anyway



Why Automate Vulnerability Response?

- ✓ Triage every CVE
- ✓ Find the right fixes
- ✓ Validate every change
- ✓ Keep compliance evidence



Security response must be repeatable, scalable, and auditable.

Scope: Known Kernel Vulnerabilities

Out of Scope: Zero-Day Response


- Unknown or newly discovered vulnerabilities
- Requires incident-driven investigation and emergency mitigation

In Scope: 1-Day and N-Day Response

- Public vulnerability information and fixes are usually available
- Triage, backporting, testing, and evidence can be automated


The pipeline automates repeatable response to known vulnerabilities, not the discovery or containment of zero-day attacks.

Manual Response Bottlenecks



Linux Kernel CVE Response Workflow

From CVE to Release




Where AI Can Help in the Workflow

AI supports each step, but engineers remain in control.

-  Triage: Summarize CVEs and analyze product impact
-  Find the Fix: Find upstream fixes and patch dependencies
-  Backport: Explain conflicts and suggest adaptations
-  Validate: Suggest targeted tests and analyze failures
-  Release & Evidence: Summarize decisions, test results, and traceability

CI Pipeline with an AI-Assisted Path



Stage 1 & 2: CVE Intake, Triage & Prioritization

Is this CVE really our problem?

- ✓ Gather CVEs from trusted sources
- ✓ Match against our kernel version & config
- ✓ Check whether the vulnerable path is reachable
- ✓ Prioritize by actual product impact

Result: Applicability decision + Priority + Evidence

- 2026/08/04 #3: [CVE-2026-64562: KVM: nVMX: Hide shadow VMCS right after VMCLEAR](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)
- 2026/08/04 #2: [CVE-2026-64563: rhashtable: clear stale iter->p on table restart](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)
- 2026/08/04 #1: [CVE-2026-64564: sctp: don't free the ASCONF's own transport in DEL-IP processing](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)
- 2026/07/30 #1: [CVE-2022-4994: KVM: x86: wean fast IN from emulator pio_in](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)
- 2026/07/29 #5: [CVE-2026-64560: posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec\(\) race](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)
- 2026/07/29 #4: [CVE-2026-64558: s390/pkey: Check length in pkey_pckmo handler implementation](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)
- 2026/07/29 #3: [CVE-2026-64559: s390/pkey: Check length in PKEY_VERIFYPROTK ioctl](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)
- 2026/07/29 #2: [CVE-2026-64556: perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)
- 2026/07/29 #1: [CVE-2026-64557: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_new_connection](#) (Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>)

Metrics		CVE	Exploit
CVSS Version 4.0	CVSS Version 3.x	CVSS Version 2.0	
NVD enrichment efforts reference publicly available information to associate vector strings. CVSS information contributed by other sources is also displayed.			
CVSS 3.x Severity and Vector Strings:			
	NIST: NVD	Base Score: N/A	
NVD assessment not yet provided.			
	CNA: kernel.org	Base Score: 8.8 HIGH	
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/CH:H/A:H			
https://copy.fail	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19d43105a97be0810edbd875f2cd03f30dc130c	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3115af9644c342b356f3f07a4dd1c8905cd9a6fc	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/893d272e0135fa394db81df88697fba6032747667
	kernel.org	kernel.org	kernel.org

Source: linux-cve-announce, vulns.git, stable repo, NVD

Stage 3: Finding the Complete Fix

One CVE may require more than one patch

- ✓ Find the original upstream fix
- ✓ Locate the best stable backport
- ✓ Identify prerequisites and follow-up fixes
- ✓ Track patch origin and relationships

```
bpf: Use RCU-safe iteration in dev_map_redirect_multi() SKB path  
[ Upstream commit 8ed82f807bb09d2c8455aaa665f2c6cb17bc6a19 ]  
  
The DEVMAP_HASH branch in dev_map_redirect_multi() uses  
hlist_for_each_entry_safe() to iterate hash buckets, but this func  
runs under RCU protection (called from xdp_do_generic_redirect_map  
in softirq context). Concurrent writers (__dev_map_hash_update_ele  
dev_map_hash_delete_elem) modify the list using RCU primitives
```

Result: Complete patch set ready for backporting

Stage 4: Backport Complexity Assessment

Choose the fastest safe path

- ✓ Check whether the fix already exists
- ✓ Attempt automated patch application
- ✓ Analyze conflicts, APIs, and dependencies
- ✓ Assess backport complexity

Simple → CI Path

Complex → AI-Assisted Path

Decision: CI or AI-Assisted Path

Stage 5A: CI-Based Backporting

For clean and repeatable fixes

- ✓ Apply the patch automatically
- ✓ Detect patch conflicts
- ✓ Preserve patch metadata and traceability
- ✓ Send the candidate to validation

Output: Backport candidate ready for validation

Stage 5B: AI-Assisted Backporting

For conflicts and older kernels

- ✓ Explain the original fix intent
- ✓ Analyze conflicts and missing dependencies
- ✓ Suggest adaptations for the target kernel
- ✓ Suggest targeted validation tests
- ✓ Require engineer review


```
# 🤖 [Project/Task Name] Agent Instructions

## 1. Agent Role & Domain Context
## 2. Environment & Prerequisites
## 3. Workflow & Pipeline
    ### Step 1: Pre-check & Context Gathering
    ### Step 2: Code Modification / Backporting
    ### Step 3: Conflict Resolution (If applicable)
    ### Step 4: Verification & Static Analysis
## 4. Coding & System Conventions
## 5. Allowed Tools & Commands
## 6. Safety Guardrails & Forbidden Actions
## 7. Output & Commit Message Format
## 8. Escalation & Fallback Rules
```

Output: Engineer-reviewed candidate ready for validation

AI-Driven Threat Modeling for CVE Backporting

- AI identifies the security invariant.
- The invariant guides conflict resolution and backporting.



Key question:

“Does the backported patch preserve the original security property?”

Example:

“An unprivileged process must not access a kernel object after it is freed.”

Stage 6: Validation Gate

Every candidate must pass the same checks

- ✓ Build with product configurations
- ✓ Run boot and smoke tests
- ✓ Run LTP and kernel selftests
- ✓ Detect new regressions against the baseline
- ✓ Run vulnerability-specific tests

```
CVE-2026-46111  
|-- Makefile  
|-- WORK_SUMMARY.md  
|-- guide.md  
|-- qemu-test.conf  
|-- test_big_sync_lifetime.c
```

Decision: Accept, Rework, or Investigate

When Validation Gets Hard

Some fixes need more than a VM

- ✓ VMs provide fast and scalable testing
- ✓ Some bugs depend on real hardware behavior
- ✓ Drivers, DMA, and peripherals may need device testing
- ✓ Hardware labs can also be automated


Use real hardware when the affected path depends on it.



Linux Kernel Validation Tools

- LTP: Broad system and kernel regression testing
- Kernel Selftests: Targeted testing for kernel features and interfaces
- Syzkaller: Coverage-guided fuzzing for finding unexpected bugs

Different tools catch different kinds of problems.



When Automation Meets Reality #1

Security Guardrails Can Block Valid Verification

- ⚠️ CVE test generation may look like exploit development
- 🛑 The AI agent may flag or stop the task
- 👤 An engineer reviews the intent and risk
- ✅ Approved testing continues in an isolated environment

```
This content was flagged for possible cybersecurity risk. If this seems wrong, try  
rephrasing your request. To get authorized for security work, join the Trusted Access  
for Cyber program: https://chatgpt.com/cyber
```

When Automation Meets Reality #2

AI Agents Can Get Stuck

-  Repeats the same failed approach
-  Misses hidden kernel assumptions
-  More context can add more noise
-  Stops after a defined retry limit
-  Hands the task off to an engineer

```
% Patch failed
```

Good automation knows when to stop.

When Automation Meets Reality #3

AI Can Cost More Than Tokens



Retries: Conflicts and failures trigger repeated attempts



Growing Context: More code, patches, and logs increase usage




Validation Loops: Every change needs another build and test



Engineer Time: Incorrect results still need human review

Measure total engineering cost, not just token cost.



Humans on the Loop vs. in the Loop

Today · In the Loop

-  Review AI-generated results
-  Resolve complex cases
-  Approve critical decisions
-  Stop unsafe automation

Direction · On the Loop

-  Monitor routine automation
-  Handle exceptions
-  Define limits and guardrails
-  Step in when needed

Key Takeaways

- Automate repeatable CVE response tasks
- Use AI as an engineering assistant
- Keep validation and critical decisions under human control

Q&A

Thank you!!